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BC POLICE HAVE NEW POWER 
TO INSPECT MOTORCYCLE 
HELMETS
Police in British Columbia now have a new authority 
to inspect motorcycle helmets. Legislation enacted 
under BC’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) allows police to 
inspect motorcycle helmets at the roadside to ensure 
they meet approved standards.
Subsection (3) requires a person operating 
a motorcycle on a highway or riding  as a 
passenger on it to wear a motorcycle safety 
helmet that is designated as approved by regulation 
or meets the prescribed standards and specifications. 
Under the Designation of Motorcycle Safety Helmets 
Regulation, the following are such helmets: 
 
• Snell Memorial Foundation 2005 Standard for 
Protective Headgear For Use with Motorcycles and 
Other Motorized Vehicles; 
• Snell Memorial Foundation 2010 Standard for 
Protective Headgear For Use with Motorcycles and 
Other Motorized Vehicles; 
• Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 218; 
Motorcycle helmets (United States of America), 
also known as FMVSS 218 (49 CPR 571.218);
• United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) ECE Regulation No. 22 - Uniform provisions 
concerning the approval of protective helmets and 
of their visors for drivers and passengers of motor 
cycles and mopeds.   
Section 194 also permits the seizure of non-
approved helmets: 
Subsection (4) requires a motorcycle 
operator to not allow a person under the 
age of 16 to ride on the motorcycle 
without wearing an approved helmet. 
  
Obstruction
 
An MVA obstruction charge is triggered 
when a person “obstructs or attempts” to 
obstruct a peace officer demanding 
inspection of or seizing a non approved helmet.
 
s. 194(8) Without a warrant, a peace officer may 
(a) demand that a person produce a motorcycle 
safety helmet to allow the peace officer to 
determine whether the motorcycle safety helmet 
complies with subsection (3) …
s. 194(8) Without a warrant, a peace officer may … 
(b) seize the motorcycle safety helmet if, on 
production of the motorcycle safety helmet, the 
peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person has contravened subsection (3) or (4).
s. 194(9) A person commits an offence if the 
person obstructs or attempts to obstruct a peace 
officer acting under the authority of subsection 
(8).
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Mark your calendars. The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are 
hosting  the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police 
leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership 
topics presented by world renowned speakers.
“The Service of Policing: Meeting Public Expectations”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
see 
pages 
38-39
see pages 30-31
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Assessment [videorecording]: show what you know.
New Westminister, BC: Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, c2011.
1 videodisc (DVD, 120 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
Alice Cassidy reviews the interconnection between 
the following: learning  objectives; choice of 
assignments, tests, and other ways for students to 
demonstrate their learning; and grading  rubrics and 
associated feedback. She also discusses how to 
evaluate simulations, the potential for self, peer, or 
co-assessment and the techniques for authentic 
assessment such as the use of portfolios.
LB 2822.75 C377 2011 D1318
Blowing smoke: rethinking  the war on drugs 
without prohibition and rehab.
Michael J. Reznicek.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
c2012.
HV 5825 R484 2012
Body language I [videorecording]: beyond words.
Stage Fright Productions.
written by Kathleen O. Ryan and Louise Schrank.
Lake Zurich, IL: Learning  Seed; Orangeville: 
McIntyre Media [distributor], 2008.
1 videodisc (ca. 24 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
This program is an informative look into the 
fascinating  world of nonverbal communication. It 
guides viewers through the land of space wars,  
tongue showing, mirrored postures and the many 
layers that make up unspoken communication.
BF 637 N66 B633 2008 D1340
 
Body language II [videorecording]: reading people.
Stage Fright Productions.
written by Kathleen O. Ryan and Louise Schrank.
Lake Zurich, IL  Learning Seed, 2008.
1 videodisc (24 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
This program shows how to become a “people 
reader” attuned to non-verbal clues. Paralanguage, 
eye behavior, cultural differences, touch, space and 
time are explained.
BF 637 N66 B639 2008 D1341
The book of road-tested activities.
Elaine Biech, editor.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2011.
HD 30.26 B66 2011
Bullying, suicide, and homicide:  understanding, 
assessing, and preventing  threats to self and 
others for victims of bullying.
Butch Losey.
New York, NY: Routledge, c2011.
BF 637 B85 L67 2011
Changing  adolescence:  social change and its role 
in adolescent mental health.
Ann Hagell.
Bristol: Policy, 2012.
RJ 503 H344 2012
Distance education:  a systems view of online 
learning.
Michael G. Moore, Greg Kearsley.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, c2012.
LC 5805 M66 2012
Everyone communicates, few connect: what the 
most effective people do differently.
John C. Maxwell.
Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, c2010.
HF 5718 M393 2010
Have a nice conflict: how to find success and 
satisfaction in the most unlikely places.
Tim Scudder, Michael Patterson, Kent Mitchell.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
HD 42 S38 2012
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I know who you are and I saw what you did: 
social networks and the death of privacy.
Lori Andrews.
New York, NY: Free Press, 2012.
HM 851 A66 2012
Kids pick up on  everything:  how parental  stress is 
toxic to kids.
David Code.
United States: c2011.
HQ 769 C63 2011
Leadership  in dangerous situations: a handbook for 
the Armed Forces, emergency services, and first 
responders.
edited by Patrick J. Sweeney, Michael D. Matthews, 
and Paul B. Lester.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, c2011.
HD 57.7 L43 2011
The manager's pocket guide to mega thinking  and 
planning.
Roger Kaufman.
Amherst, MA: HRD Press, c2011.
HD 30.28 K377 2011
Quality management systems: requirements.
British Standards Institution.
London: British Standards Institution, 2008.
TS 156 Q83 2008
Racing  thoughts [videorecording] = Ça tourne dans 
ma tête.
A film by Louiselle Noël.
Montréal, QC: National Film Board of Canada, 
2010.
1 videodisc (73 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4in.
Special features: Interview with Dr. Stan Kutcher, 
interview with the director.
A film about children who live with mental illness 
and their loved ones who make the courageous 
decision to open up about their stories. Their  
voices are complemented by that of the director, 
who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder as an adult 
and powerfully evokes the initial symptoms,  
which emerged in her childhood.
RC 454 R118 2010 D1332
Restoring  the honouring circle: taking a stand 
against youth sexual exploitation.
New Westminster, BC: School of Community and 
Social Justice, Justice Institute of British Columbia, 
2011.
HQ149 B7 H88 2011
Riding with Madonna [videorecording].
Odd Squad Productions.
Vancouver, BC: Odd Squad, c2012.
1 videodisc (48 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Linda Stewart is a Vancouver Police Officer with a 
long  history, not to mention a strong  passion for 
street policing. She goes to work early to help keep 
our city safe. Linda is an experienced hostage 
negotiator.   This film looks at the career, future and 
extraordinary personality of an inspirational 
policewoman.
HV 8023 R535 2011 D1394
Scenario planning  in organizations:  how to 
create, use, and assess scenarios.
Thomas J. Chermack.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, c2011.
HD 30.26 C48 2011
The separation guide: know your options, take 
control, and get your life back.
David Greig.
North Vancouver, BC: Self-Counsel Press, c2011.
HQ 838 G74 2011
Social engineering: the art of human hacking.
by Christopher Hadnagy; foreword by Paul Wilson].
Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, c2011.
HM 668 H33 2011
Visual teams: graphic tools for commitment, 
innovation, & high performance.
David Sibbet.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, c2011.
HD 66 S565 2011
 
   www.10-8.ca
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OFFICER’S HONEST BELIEF 
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY 
OBJECTIVE FACTS
R. v. Brown, 2012 ONCA 225
A police officer was driving  his 
cruiser near an intersection with his 
partner seated beside him. He saw 
the accused, a 6’7” male wearing  a 
distinctive green baseball cap, fully 
extend his right arm with a closed fist towards a 
second person of unknown gender. This second 
person did not extend their hand towards the 
accused or reciprocate in any way to his gesture but 
turned around abruptly and walked away at a fast 
pace.  The accused crossed the street and kept his 
closed right hand by his side. The arresting  officer’s 
partner, however, did not see any of this behaviour. 
Based on the officer’s experience of seeing  hand-to-
hand transactions, the way the accused held his 
hand and the area being  known for crime, the officer 
believed the accused was concealing  drugs in his 
hand.  The accused was arrested after each officer 
grabbed one of his arms on the busy public 
sidewalk, searched him incidental to arrest and 
found cocaine, marijuana and a considerable 
amount of cash.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
                                                                                                          
The accused argued that his arrest 
and subsequent search violated his s. 
9 Charter  rights and the drugs should 
be excluded as evidence under s. 
24(2). But the judge disagreed. The 
officer testified that he believed he 
had reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest the accused based on the 
observations he made from the police 
car. The judge concluded there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
investigate and detain the accused, 
search him and, upon finding  drugs, 
a r res t h im. The accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine, 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing marijuana. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again alleged the officer did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds. The Ontario Court 
of Appeal agreed, determining  that the issue was not 
whether there were grounds to detain and eventually 
search the accused, but whether the officer had 
grounds to arrest the accused when he physically 
confronted him on the street. 
Arrest
The Court of Appeal accepted that the officer 
honestly believed the accused was in possession of 
drugs and had attempted a hand-to-hand 
transaction.  Further, it was agreed that the officer’s 
prior experience with drug  dealing  was properly 
taken into account. However, the officer’s subjective 
belief was not objectively reasonable:
In our view ... there must be something in the 
conduct observed by the officer, placed in the 
context of the rest of the circumstances, that 
lends some objective justification or verification 
to the officer’s belief.  Section 495 of the 
Criminal Code and, more importantly, s. 9 of the 
Charter demand that the belief be “reasonable”, 
meaning that a reasonable person standing in 
the shoes of the police officer be able to see the 
grounds for the arrest. Without this objective 
component, the scope of the police power to 
arrest would be defined entirely by the police 
of f icer ’s percept ion of the re levant 
circumstances. The individual’s constitutional 
right to be left alone by the state cannot 
depend exclusively on the officer’s subjective 
perception of events regardless of how 
accurate that perception might be. The issue 
is not the correctness of the officer’s belief, 
but the need to impose discernable 
objectively measurable limits on police 
powers.
The [accused’s] interaction with the person 
facing him on the city sidewalk does not, in 
our view, provide any objective basis upon 
which to believe that the two persons were 
engaged in a drug transaction. Nor does the 
fact that the two persons then walked away 
from each other make that interaction any 
more suspicious. [The officer’s] evidence that 
“[T]here must 
be something in 
the conduct 
observed by the 
officer, placed 
in the context of 
the rest of the 
circumstances, 
that lends some 
objective 
justification or 
verification to 
the officer’s 
belief.”
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the second person may have walked away from 
the [accused] because he or she caught sight of 
the police cruiser is speculation. [paras. 14-15]
  
In concluding  that the totality of the circumstances 
did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for 
the arresting  officer’s belief, the Court of Appeal 
noted:
 
• The arresting  officer’s partner, who was in a 
better position to see the “suspicious” conduct 
as a passenger in the police cruiser, did not 
notice anything  about the accused. And even if 
he had witnessed the movements described by 
the arresting  officer, he testified he would not 
have arrested the accused.  Instead, he said he 
would have spoken to the accused or briefly 
detained him for investigative purposes. 
• The arresting  officer did not explain why the 
way in which the accused held his right hand 
both during  and after the interaction with the 
other person was of some part icular 
significance in the drug  world. Without such an 
explanation, these actions did “not elevate the 
circumstances to reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest.”
• The evidence supporting  the off icer’s 
contention that this took place in a high crime 
area was thin.  The officers were assigned to 
patrol this area as part of an anti-violence 
intervention strategy.  Criminal activity, 
including  drug  activity, had apparently 
increased in the area.   However, “the area 
targeted by the police activity was broad and 
the concerns were not particularized to drug 
activity or the specific location where these 
even t s occur red ,” sa id the Cour t o f 
Appeal. “There was no evidence that the corner 
where the arrest occurred was considered to be 
a high drug activity area.”
So although the arresting  officer had an honest belief 
that he had reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest, the belief was not objectively reasonable. The 
arrest was therefore unlawful and breached the 
accused’s s.9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily 
detained.
The Evidence
Balancing  the factors under the s. 24(2) framework, 
the evidence was excluded. Although the evidence 
was reliable, the police conduct was serious and 
there was a significant impact on the accused's 
liberty. 
Seriousness of Police Conduct 
Although the officer honestly believed he had 
grounds to arrest, his actions demonstrated “a 
significant disregard for the [accused’s] right to be 
free from arbitrary detention.” In finding  that the 
officer’s conduct favoured exclusion, the Court 
stated:
[The arresting officer] did not turn his mind to 
the possibility of exercising police powers short 
of actual arrest.  He would not agree that any 
further investigation was appropriate. On any 
reasonable view and, we add, the view of his 
partner, further investigation was entirely 
appropriate before resorting to the coercive 
actions of an arrest. 
[The arresting officer] explained his perspective 
in these terms:
We’re able to effect an arrest and release 
unconditionally if need be. Worst case, 
scenario, if there is nothing further to 
investigate the individual can be released 
unconditionally.  As in with this case, 
where there is further investigation 
warranted, it works out to a win-win 
situation.
It is apparent that [the arresting officer] sees 
arrest as the best tool when investigating  crime.  
He arrested in this case, as he apparently 
routinely does, without considering other 
options because in his mind, if it turns out there 
are no grounds for the arrest, the individual will 
be released.   To [him], there is no harm in an 
arrest if it is brief.  The officer does not appear to 
understand that arrest is a serious intrusion on 
the personal autonomy of the person arrested. 
[The arresting  officer’s] failure to consider less 
intrusive means of investigating and his 
somewhat cavalier attitude towards the exercise 
of his powers of arrest make this s. 9 violation a 
serious one.  [paras. 23-26]
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Impact of Breach
The impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter 
protected interests also supported exclusion. “The 
police interference caused by his arrest was neither 
fleeting  nor technical,” said the Court. “The officers 
each grabbed the [accused’s] hand or arm and made 
an arrest on a busy public sidewalk. The police 
action was highly intrusive of the [accused’s] liberty 
and privacy interests.” Plus, the impact of the breach 
was still significant even if police could have briefly 
detained the accused for investigative purposes: 
While we doubt that the grounds existed even 
for an investigation detention, we are prepared 
to assume that the officer had those grounds for 
the purposes of a s. 24(2) analysis. The existence 
of a basis to detain does lessen the negative 
impact of the improper arrest on the [accused’s] 
rights, however, it does not change the fact that 
he was physically restrained on a public 
thoroughfare by two police officers who had no 
grounds to do so.  The interference remains 
significant even if some lesser interference was 
appropriate. [para. 28]
Society’s Interest 
Since the evidence of the seized drugs was entirely 
reliable and essential to the Crown’s case, society’s 
interest in an adjudication on the merits of the case 
favoured its admission. 
On balance, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
admission of the evidence would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence was 
excluded, the convictions were quashed   and an 
acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Police Leadership Conference - p. 30
Online Graduate Certificates - p. 38
BC Law Enforcement Diversity 
Network - p. 40
INFORMATION PLUS 
OBSERVATIONS PROVIDES 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Caravaggio, 2012 ONCA 248
 
A police officer had information from 
an unnamed previously reliable 
informant, who was known to be 
involved in the drug  subculture, that 
the accused was selling  drugs from 
his vehicle. The informant provided details as to the 
accused’s description,  the colour and specific make 
of his car and his residence.  The police officer 
corroborated this information by running  a CPIC 
check to determine the accused’s identification and 
address. He also went to a location near the 
accused’s residence where he saw a man, matching 
the accused’s description, in a car as described by 
the informant.  The car, with motor running, was 
parked in an alley near a café known for drug-
dealing. A male was seen leaning  through the car’s 
window speaking  to the accused. The accused was 
arrested, searched and drugs were found in his 
possession.
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice (trial)
 
The judge concluded that the police officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. The 
search was incident to arrest and there was no 
Charter  breach. The drugs were admissible as 
evidence and the accused was convicted of 
trafficking. He was sentenced to 15 months in jail.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The accused submitted that the trial judge erred in 
finding  the arrest lawful and therefore the search was 
unreasonable as incident to arrest. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal, however, rejected this argument. 
“While the officer could not say that he observed a 
drug  transaction between the [accused] and the 
other man, their interaction certainly was suspicious 
and at least consistent with a drug  transaction,” said 
the Court. “When combined with the information 
obtained from the informant, the officer’s 
observations of the [accused], his vehicle and its 
location, there was sufficient basis for the trial judge 
to find that the officer had reasonable and probable 
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grounds to arrest the [accused].” Nor were the trial 
judge’s reasons inadequate. He confronted the 
inconsistencies in the evidence of the police officers 
and, despite those inconsistencies, explained why he 
found reasonable and probable grounds. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his conviction 
was upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SUPREME COURT JUDGE 
ANNOUNCES RETIREMENT
OTTAWA: On May 18, 2012 The Right Honourable 
Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, 
announced that Justice Marie Deschamps has 
written to the Minister of Justice, the Honourable 
Robert Nicholson, to inform him that she will retire 
from the Supreme Court of Canada.  Justice 
Deschamps’s retirement will be effective August 7, 
2012. 
“Justice Deschamps has made a very significant 
contribution to the Supreme Court and, more 
broadly, to the administration of justice in Canada.  
We will miss her wisdom, intelligence, keen wit and 
boundless energy. She has been a wonderful 
colleague and will always be a good friend”, said 
Chief Justice McLachlin.
For her part, Justice Deschamps said, “I feel 
privileged to have been given the opportunity to 
participate in the work of the Court.  I will leave 
behind a group of empathetic, respectful and 
dedicated judges.  After 37 years working  mostly in 
courtrooms, including  22 years on the Bench, I feel 
that it is time to explore other ways to be of service 
to society. There is so much to do, in so many areas.” 
Justice Deschamps was appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada on August 7, 2002, after having 
served on the Quebec Court of Appeal and the 
Quebec Superior Court.
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded by saying  “I am 
certain that the Canadian government will give 
necessary care and consideration to the prompt 
appointment of a new justice of the Supreme Court 
of Canada.”
Source: News.Release.@Supreme.Court
SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED 
INFORMATION JUSTIFIES 
SEARCH
R. v. MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 244 
Police received a Crime Stoppers tip 
from an anonymous source that the 
accused, a known gun carrier and 
drug  dealer, had drugs and guns at 
his home. The tipster claimed that he 
had seen the accused “flashing  his gun”. Finally, the 
tipster said that the accused could be found at his 
mother’s or his uncle’s house and that he was driving 
a rented car. The tipster said the accused was born 
on January 24 (no year provided), used the alias 
“Morrison” and lived with his surety in Etobicoke. 
He was described as a non-white male, 6’2”, 160 
pounds, with long  black hair and brown eyes. He 
also had a tattoo of a spider web on his hand. The 
police were able to confirm much of the information 
provided by the tipster (see the information/ 
corroboration grid).
 
Based on this information, the police obtained a 
warrant to search the residence where the accused 
lived – his uncle’s place. Police also requested night 
time entry because they wanted to ensure they had 
enough time to gather the resources necessary to 
execute the warrant and, in their view, any delay 
could result in the loss of evidence or endanger the 
public (ie. the firearm).  Before police arrived and 
searched around 3:00 am, the accused had been 
arrested for breaching  his recognizance. They found 
two loaded handguns in the house and he was 
charged with illegally possessing  them, breach of 
recognizance and several other offences.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The judge ruled there were sufficient reasonable 
grounds for the search warrant. Although the police 
might have done more, what they did do was 
reasonable considering  they had information about 
guns on the street. The police investigation provided 
some reasonable corroboration of the information 
received from the anonymous tipster and, 
considering  the totality of the circumstances, the 
warrant could have been issued by the authorizing 
justice. The evidence was admitted and the accused 
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was convicted. He was sentenced to two years less a 
day and three years probation but appealed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
Justice Laskin, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, first outlined the legal framework for 
issuing a search warrant.
 
The justice issuing  the warrant must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence 
has been committed. The standard is one of 
reasonable probability.  The material in support 
of the warrant must raise a reasonable 
probability of discovering evidence of a crime. 
 
Where the application for the warrant is based 
largely on information coming  from a 
confidential informant, the court must make 
three inquires:
 
• Was the information predicting the crime 
compelling?
• Was the source of the information credible?
• Was the information corroborated by the 
police before conducting the search?
INFORMATION-CORROBORATION GRID
Information (about accused) Corroboration
His date of birth is “January 24”. Police databases confirm a date of birth - January 24, 1988.
He is male, non white, 6’ 2”  and 160 pounds, 
with black long hair and brown eyes.
CPIC describes him as male, non white, 6’ 4” tall and 146 pounds.
He has a tattoo of a spider web on his hand. CPIC describes him having a tattoo of a spider web with flames on his left hand.
He is a drug dealer and has drugs in his 
house.
In January 2006, the accused was found in possession of 6.58 grams of crack cocaine and was 
charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking. He was ultimately convicted of possessing 
cocaine.
The tipster saw him “flashing his gun”  and he 
has guns at his house.
The accused had a lengthy criminal  record. His record listed several  serious offences of violence, 
including assault, robbery, assault with intent to resist arrest, aggravated assault, carrying a 
concealed weapon and escaping lawful  custody. In January 2006, he was found in possession of a 
loaded AK 47 assault rifle that had been converted to fire ammunition in fully automatic mode. He 
was convicted of possession of a prohibited firearm. The police affiant, a member of the Guns and 
Gangs Task Force, knew that it is very common for drug traffickers to arm themselves. The accused 
was bound by two separate firearms prohibition and probation orders that prohibited possession of a 
weapon.
He uses the alias “Morrison”. CPIC listed “Morrison” as his alias.
He resides at his surety’s house. The accused was currently before the court charged with aggravated assault and several related 
offences. The allegations pertained to a stabbing in which he allegedly chased down the victim and 
stabbed him in the back and slashed his face. As a result of these charges, he was bound by a 
recognizance that required him to reside with his uncle under house arrest. On April 7 and April 8, 
2008, police observed him coming and going from his uncle’s house.
His surety’s house is in Etobicoke. His uncle’s house was located at 54 Alhart Drive, in the north-west area of Toronto near Islington Ave 
and Albion Rd.
He usually hangs out at his mother’s house or 
at his uncle’s house.
Police occurrence reports confirm that he has resided with his mother in the east end of Toronto and 
had been investigated by the police in that area on numerous occasions.
He drives a rental vehicle. On April 7 and April 8, 2008, police observed the accused driving a vehicle registered to a car rental 
company. On April 8, 2008, police observed him attending at the car rental outlet and exchanging 
one rental car for another.
He is affiliated with a gang. No corroboration.
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  These are not watertight inquiries.  It is the 
“totality of the circumstances” that must meet 
the reasonable probability standard. 
 
So, for example, where, as in this case, the 
police rely on information coming from an 
anonymous source, the second inquiry is 
problematic. The court has no way to assess the 
credibility or reliability of the source.   Thus, the 
quality of the information (the first inquiry) and 
the amount of corroboration (the third inquiry) 
must compensate for the inability to assess the 
credibility of the source.  A higher level of 
verification is required.  [references omitted, 
paras. 6-8]
 
Since the credibility of the source could not be 
determined in this case, the totality of circumstances 
assessment needed to focus on whether the tipster’s 
information was sufficiently compelling  and whether 
it was sufficiently corroborated. The accused 
suggested the information provided by the tipster 
was not particularly compelling  while the Crown 
contended that it was very compelling.  Justice 
Laskin, taking  middle ground on this issue, found the 
information was “reasonably compelling”:
 
First, although a good deal of the information 
was biographical, and thus likely widely known, 
it was nonetheless very detailed. The tipster 
provided specific information about the 
[accused’s] appearance, date of birth, place of 
residence, alias, bail status, family connections 
and driving  practices.  Second, the tipster had 
first-hand knowledge that the [accused] was 
involved with guns.  He saw the [accused] 
“flash” a gun.” [para. 19]
 
With the source being  anonymous, more 
confirmation than otherwise was required. But “the 
police were not obliged, before conducting  the 
search, to confirm the very criminality alleged by the 
tipster.” In finding  that police sufficiently 
corroborated the information, Justice Laskin noted 
that police confirmed much of the tipster’s 
information: 
• police record and data banks confirmed the 
accuracy of the detailed biographical information 
given by the tipster; and 
• police investigation confirmed that the accused 
had in the past possessed both drugs and guns, 
was a known violent offender, and was bound by 
two separate firearms prohibitions and probation 
orders prohibiting the possession of guns. 
Although each one of these facts by themselves 
would likely not be sufficient to justify the warrant, 
the accused’s record together with the confirmation 
of the detailed biographical information given by the 
tipster reasonably supported the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the authorizing  justice could have 
granted the authorization.  
 
Night Time Search
 
“Night time searches of a private residence should 
be carried out only in exceptional cases,” the Court 
of Appeal said. The authorizing  justice in this case 
did have a reasonable basis to authorize such a 
search.  “When the authorization was granted, the 
[accused] was not in custody,” said Justice Laskin. 
“The grounds in the affidavit provided a sound basis 
to allow the warrant to be executed at night.” In 
addition, the police were not required to delay their 
search until daytime because the accused was taken 
into custody prior to the warrant’s execution: 
The police were justified in not delaying the 
search and instead conducting it in the middle of 
the night.  The [accused] did not live alone; he 
shared the residence with others. The police had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
there were firearms in that residence. And even 
though the [accused] was in custody, he had the 
opportunity to contact the other occupants and 
tell them to hide or remove the guns. Thus, the 
police had a legitimate concern that if they 
waited to execute the warrant, they would 
compromise public safety and put the 
community at risk. [para. 28] 
Plus, there were some factors mitigating  against the 
intrusiveness of the search. The police told the 
accused about their proposed search before they 
carried it out. There was no evidence that a “no 
knock” entry was conducted, or that police had their 
guns drawn, or even that they frightened anyone.  
The night time search was not unreasonable and 
therefore there was no s. 8 Charter breach. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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COURT SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS 
IN SECOND GUESSING OFFICER 
SAFETY
R. v. Naidu, 2012 BCCA 150
After a motor vehicle accident 
happened at about 2:30 am, police 
arrived on scene at 2:42 am. At 2:52 
am an Approved Screening  Device 
(ASD) demand was read to the 
accused and he failed at 2:53 am.  After forming  an 
opinion that the accused was impaired by alcohol, 
the officer arrested the accused at 2:55 am and then 
read him the breath demand at 3:07 am. The 
accused was polite and cooperative throughout. 
During  the 12 minutes between forming  his 
reasonable and probable grounds and giving  the 
breath demand, the officer did the following:
1. Arrested the accused, placed him in handcuffs 
and sat him in the back seat of the police 
cruiser;
2. Discussed the wrist pain the accused was 
experiencing;
3. Checked his driver’s licence status, CPIC record 
and PRIME record. The officer wanted to 
determine whether the accused had any 
outstanding  arrest warrants, history of violence 
with the police, contagious diseases or driving 
prohibitions; and
4. Read him his Charter rights using  the official 
warning.
The accused was taken to the police station where 
he provided two breath samples of 130 mg% each. 
British Columbia Provincial Court (trial)
The trial judge concluded that the 12 or so minutes 
between the officer forming  the opinion and reading 
the breath demand was reasonable. The officer had 
explained he did not know the accused, knew 
nothing  about his background or whether he had 
any involvement with weapons. Since he was going 
to drive the accused to the station, the officer 
needed to know the accused’s background and the 
activities he undertook were related to the 
investigation. “The police officer used the time in 
question to check for outstanding  warrants and other 
information regarding  any known interactions with 
the police and information regarding  contagious 
diseases,” said the judge. The demand was made as 
soon as practicable and the accused was convicted 
of over 80 mg%. A conviction for impaired driving 
was stayed.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued that the trial judge erred in 
concluding  that the breath demand was made “as 
soon as practicable” under s. 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code. But the appeal judge disagreed, ruling  that the 
trial judge did not err in interpreting  this 
requirement under the law. “The computer queries 
were related to the investigation of the [accused] 
and took a reasonable amount of time,” he said. “I 
am unable to say that there was any unreasonable 
delay.” Nor did the trial judge err in applying  the law 
to the facts. Just because the accused was polite, 
cooperative and secured in handcuffs in the back of 
the partitioned police vehicle, he had failed an ASD 
test and was arrested. The officer testified he needed 
to know as soon as possible whether he was dealing 
with someone with a contagious disease or someone 
with a history of violence toward the police. “In my 
view, the court should be cautious in second-
guessing  a police officer’s judgment with respect to 
his personal safety,” said the appeal judge. The trial 
judge did not err in finding  it was reasonable for the 
officer to make the safety checks before making  the 
demand. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
TIME LINE
MVA ON-SCENE ASD DEMAND ASD FAIL ARREST BTA DEMAND
2:30 am 2:42 am 2:52 am 2:53 am 2:55 am 3:07 am
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
A further appeal by the accused was dismissed. 
Justice Lowry, delivering  the unanimous Court of 
Appeal judgment, concluded, for the same reasons 
as the appeal judge, that no error had been made in 
upholding the accused’s conviction.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
DETENTION JUSTIFICATION 
REQUIRES MORE THAN HUNCH
R. v. Bruyere, 2012 ONCA 329
A police officer received information 
from a sergeant in charge of a drug 
investigation that a man named Hyatt 
had just completed a drug  transaction 
at a hotel and was couriering  the 
drugs back to Fort Frances. The police officer 
followed a vehicle occupied by two unidentified 
men leaving  the hotel. Suspecting  that one of the 
occupants may be Hyatt, the officer instructed that 
the vehicle be pulled over as it travelled on the 
TransCanada Highway toward Fort Frances.  The 
vehicle was stopped, the accused was driving  and 
Hyatt, a passenger, was arrested. A search following 
the arrest resulted in the discovery of cocaine.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The judge found the officer did not have sufficient 
grounds to justify an investigative detention of the 
vehicle’s occupants at the roadside.  In the judge’s 
view, the officer ordering  the stop did not have 
reasonable grounds to suspect that Hyatt was in the 
vehicle. Instead, he found the officer had nothing 
more than a hunch. The judge ruled that the accused 
was arbitrarily detained at the roadside (a s. 9 
Charter breach) and that the search of his vehicle 
which led to the discovery of the cocaine was 
unreasonable. The evidence, however, was admitted 
under s. 24(2). The judge found that exigent 
circumstances existed and, because the sergeant in 
charge of the drug  investigation “likely had enough 
information to detain the vehicle ... on an 
investigative detention basis”, the unconstitutionality 
of the stop was mitigated. The accused was 
convicted of three drug related offences. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial judge erred in not 
excluding  the evidence after properly finding  a 
Charter breach. The Crown argued, on the other 
hand, that the judge erred in finding  a Charter 
violation in the first place, but properly admitted the 
evidence in any event. In the Crown’s submission, 
the sergeant in charge of the investigation who 
provided the information about the drug  transaction 
did have sufficient grounds to justify the accused’s 
detention.  The sergeant’s reasonable suspicion 
therefore rendered the accused’s detention 
constitutional under s. 9. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that neither officer 
had sufficient grounds to justify the detention. 
“Whether one looks at [the officer’s] grounds for 
detaining  the vehicle, [the sergeant's] grounds for 
detaining  the vehicle, or combines the two, the 
result is the same,” said the Court. “The stop was 
arbitrary in that there were no reasonable grounds to 
suspect that Hyatt was in the vehicle before the 
officers stopped the vehicle.” Thus, the evidence 
discovered in the search of the vehicle which 
followed immediately after the identification and 
arrest of Hyatt constituted evidence obtained in a 
manner that infringed the accused’s rights under s. 9 
of the Charter. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were quashed and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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CRIME SCENE REENACTMENT 
REPETITION OF CONFESSION
R. v. Evans, 2012 BCCA 209
The accused was taken into custody 
in Calgary after turning  himself in 
with a lawyer. He was arrested for the 
strangulation murder of a Vancouver 
sex-trade worker but he refused to say 
anything  about it on the advice of counsel. He was 
flown to Vancouver where the crime took place, 
driven from the airport to his lawyer's office and 
spoke in private for over an hour. He was then taken 
to the police lockup and placed in an interview 
room. His lawyer attended and they spoke for 20 to 
30 minutes.  A detective then interviewed the 
accused for about two hours. He described how he 
met the victim, killed her and attempted to hide her 
body. He also discussed his travel to Calgary.  The 
detective suggested that the accused 
perform a reenactment of the killing 
as a form of “catharsis”, but that they 
would not go to the crime scene. The 
accused sought legal advice by 
telephone and was given privacy for that 
purpose.  The detective then suggested that they go 
to the accused’s apartment to find a hooded shirt he 
said he had taken.  After trying  to find the hooded 
shirt (which was not found), the detective said they 
would go to the crime scene. They went to the 
deceased’s apartment and the accused reenacted his 
meeting  with her, the killing  and his attempt to 
conceal the body. This was videotaped. He was 
charged with second degree murder.
British Columbia Supreme Court (trial)
The accused argued that his jeopardy changed when 
police decided to expand its investigation from a 
videotaped interview at the police station to a 
videotaped re-enactment at the deceased’s 
apartment. In his view, he sought legal advice in 
relation to the intended location of the re-enactment 
being  at a place other than the crime scene. Had he 
known the re-enactment was to take place at the 
crime scene and not elsewhere, he would not have 
consented to doing  it. This change in jeopardy, he 
contended, required the police to re-advise him of 
his right to counsel and provide him with another 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer. The trial judge 
disagreed. There was no new jeopardy. The accused 
had given a full confession to the crime and the 
reenactment was simply an extension of that 
confession. Thus, there was no s. 10(b) Charter 
breach and the crime scene reenactment was 
admitted. A jury found the accused guilty of second-
degree murder.  
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in not finding  a s. 10(b) Charter 
breach and admitting  the evidence of the crime 
scene re-enactment. He opined that his jeopardy 
changed because he did not have an opportunity to 
obtain legal advice about the re-enactment taking 
place at the crime scene. But Justice Low, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal, found the trial judge did not 
err:
It seems to me that the re-enactment was 
nothing  more than a repetition of the earlier 
confession with the [accused] pointing  out 
where he and [the deceased] were during the 
events in the bedroom, as captured by the police 
re-enactment video. In this sense, the judge was 
correct in describing  it as an extension of the 
earlier confession.
I am unable to find fault with the judge’s 
reasoning  and I would not give effect to the 
[accused’s] argument.  The [accused] knew he 
was facing a murder charge before the detective 
proposed the re-enactment and he knew the 
extent of his jeopardy had not changed when he 
agreed to go to the crime scene for the re-
enactment.  By then, he had received legal 
advice at least four times. He must have known 
that he could cease co-operating with the police 
investigation whenever he chose to do so.  None 
of the cases relied upon by the [accused] with 
respect to this argument make a point in his 
favour.  They are clearly distinguishable. All 
involve situations where the police, in 
withholding  information from the accused, 
materially affected the accused’s understanding 
of the extent of his jeopardy... . Nothing of that 
sort occurred here. This is so whether [the 
detective] changed his mind about going to the 
crime scene or deliberately misled the [accused] 
catharsis:     
the purging 
of emotions 
or relieving 
of emotional 
tensions.
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as to what he intended. There was no breach of 
the [accused’s] s. 10(b) rights as a result of the 
re-enactment’s taking place at the crime scene 
rather than elsewhere. [paras. 36-37]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his murder 
conviction upheld. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BURDEN ON ACCUSED TO 
PROVE, NOT CROWN TO 
DISPROVE, CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Furlong, 2012 NLCA 29
 
The accused was driving  a motor 
vehicle when she was stopped by 
police. A roadside breathalyzer test 
was administered followed by a 
breathalyzer demand. She was also 
informed of her right to counsel. She said she 
understood and that she did not wish to speak to a 
lawyer. The accused provided breath samples 
registering  over the legal limit. She was charged with 
impaired driving and over 80mg%. 
Newfoundland Provincial Court (trial)
Because there was no evidence elicited from the 
officer of what information he gave to the accused 
concerning  Legal Aid, either through direct 
examination or cross examination, the accused 
argued her right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the 
Charter was violated. The Crown, on the other hand, 
claimed that the accused had not proven that her 
Charter right to counsel had been 
breached just because the officer did 
not testify that he told her she could 
contact Legal Aid and how to do it. 
The judge ruled there was no 
evidence that Legal Aid information 
had been given and therefore the 
accused’s s. 10(b) right had been 
infringed. The breathalyzer certificate 
was excluded under s. 24(2) and both 
charges were dismissed for lack of 
evidence. 
Newfoundland Supreme Court    
The Crown submitted that the trial judge shifted the 
burden of proving  a Charter breach from the 
accused and was requiring  the Crown prove that the 
accused’s right to counsel had not been breached. 
The appeal court judge, however, dismissed the 
Crown’s appeal and upheld the lower court ruling. 
There was no evidence supporting  compliance with 
the informational component of s. 10(b). Since there 
was no evidence from the officer respecting  Legal 
Aid, the accused’s right to counsel was deficient.  
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
On further appeal by Crown, a unanimous Court of 
Appeal concluded that the absence of evidence 
concerning  information about Legal Aid was 
insufficient to prove the right to counsel given by the 
officer was deficient and breached the accused’s s. 
10(b) rights.  “Section 10 of the Charter accords 
positive rights,” said Justice Hoegg  for the Court.   “If 
an accused person claims a breach of a Charter 
right, he or she must assert the right, and prove its 
breach on the balance of probabilities.”  Discharging 
this burden of proof requires more than the officer 
failing  to give evidence that the right to counsel he 
gave her was complete.  The burden is on the 
accused to prove a breach, not on the Crown to 
establish that there was no breach. The Court of 
Appeal stated:
Proof on the balance of probabilities requires 
evidence. If there is no evidence respecting 
whether an accused has been informed of his or 
her right to counsel, including 
whether he or she has been 
informed of the availability of Legal 
Aid and how to contact it, then 
there is no proof that the crucial 
aspect of the Charter right was 
provided or not.  In the absence of 
such evidence, a court cannot 
conclude that the information 
provided to [the accused] was 
deficient and that her s. 10(b) right 
was breached. [para. 23]
“Section 10 of the 
Charter accords positive 
rights. If an accused 
person claims a breach 
of a Charter right, he or 
she must assert the 
right, and prove its 
breach on the balance of 
probabilities.”
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And further:
Charter rights are not like the elements of an 
offence.  An offence is a charge of the Crown 
against an accused person.  So, the Crown 
always has the burden to prove each element of 
the charge in order to prove the offence.  The 
right to counsel is a Charter right accorded to an 
accused.  An accused must assert the right and 
evidence must be adduced to prove its breach, 
in much the same way as a plaintiff prosecutes a 
civil claim against a defendant, ie. a plaintiff 
who claims that he or she has been wronged by 
a defendant must adduce evidence to prove the 
wrong in order for the claim to succeed. [para. 
26]
Here, the officer did not testify about Legal Aid 
information at all, nor was he asked any questions 
about it. Had he testified that he had not provided 
Legal Aid information, then the accused could rely 
on this evidence to prove that the information 
provided was deficient and a breach resulted.  If the 
officer had said he had given Legal Aid information 
but the accused disagreed, she could adduce 
evidence to support her position by either cross-
examining  the officer or by calling  additional 
evidence, including  choosing  to testify in her own 
defence. Since there was no evidence on the Legal 
Aid aspect of the s. 10(b) right, the trial judge erred 
when he inferred from the absence of evidence 
about it that it had not been given. 
“[The officer’s] lack of testimony on the aspect of the 
right to counsel concerning  Legal Aid does not prove 
that he did not provide the Legal Aid information to 
[the accused],” said Justice Hoegg.  “It cannot be 
otherwise, for ... a court cannot assume that things 
happened or did not happen in the absence of 
evidence.  Neither can a court infer that things 
happened or did not happen in the absence of facts 
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn.” 
The accused failed to prove her right to counsel did 
not include Legal   Aid information and therefore it 
could not be said she suffered a breach of s. 10(b). 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered on the over 80mg% charge.
Complete case available at www.canli.org
POLICE REASONABLY REACTED 
TO DANGER: ENTRY JUSTIFIED
R. v. MacDonald, 2012 NSCA 50
 
After receiving  a noise complaint 
from occupants across the hall from 
the accused’s apartment, a concierge 
of a condominium building  called 
police. He had unsuccessfully asked 
the accused several times to turn down his music. 
When police arrived they could hear loud music 
within 30 feet of the apartment. They went to the 
door to simply tell the accused to turn it down. 
Police rang  the door bell and knocked. When the 
accused answered and was asked to turn down the 
music, he responded, “Go fuck yourself” and 
slammed the door. When the music got louder the 
officer called for back-up and a sergeant attended to 
assist. The sergeant knocked on the door, then 
kicked it, yelling  police.  When the accused partially 
opened the door the sergeant saw something  “black 
and shiny” in his right hand, which was somewhat 
obscured behind his right leg. The accused did not 
respond when asked, “what have you got in your 
hand?”; instead he stared at the officer. Thinking  it 
could be a knife, the sergeant pushed on the door to 
open it and saw the object was a handgun. A 
struggle ensued and police successfully disarmed the 
accused of his loaded 9 mm Beretta. He was 
charged with several gun-related offences. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court (trial)
 
The accused challenged the police entry into his 
home, asserting  it was an unlawful search and 
breached his s. 8  Charter  right. But the trial judge 
disagreed, holding  the police action was justified in 
the interests of “officer safety”. He said:
I am satisfied that there is an exemption with 
respect to officer entry into the home for 
purposes of officer safety, particularly in these 
circumstances where the pushing  of the door is 
only a minor intrusion over the threshold by 
means of an arm. I accept [the sergeant’s] 
evidence, it was only after he saw a firearm 
come up from behind the leg that he reacted by 
immediately entering the home of [the accused] 
for purposes of gaining control over the 
situation.
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The accused was convicted of careless handling  of a 
firearm, possessing  a weapon for a purpose 
dangerous to the public peace and possessing 
(without authorization) a loaded restricted firearm. 
The accused was sentenced to three years in prison.   
 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his convictions arguing, 
among  other grounds, that the trial judge erred by 
failing  to find a Charter breach when police entered 
his home. In his view, the police, without a warrant, 
charged into his apartment, wrestled him for the gun 
and arrested him, when all they had to do was issue 
him a ticket for a breach of the noise by-law. 
Approaching the Apartment
Chief Justice MacDonald, with 
Justice Saunders concurring, found 
the init ial approach to the 
apartment was lawful. “The police 
were well within their rights to 
knock on the door to tell [the 
accused] to keep the noise down,” 
he said. “Knocking  at someone’s 
door for a legitimate purpose does 
not constitute a search.”  
Pushing the Door
Pushing  the door further open was 
subject to Charter scrutiny.  A 
warrantless search of a dwelling  is 
prima facie illegal and the onus is 
on the Crown to justify police entry. In doing  so, the 
Crown would need to prove that police action was 
reasonable by establishing that:
1. it was authorized by statute or common law, 
2. the law was reasonable; and 
3. the search was carried out reasonably.
In this case, the trial judge found the police action 
was justified on an “officer safety” basis. The 
majority agreed, finding  a police officer may have a 
very limited common law power to reasonably react 
to danger in appropriate circumstances. Determining 
whether police have a common law power to act 
involves a two-prong  test - whether the action (1) fell 
within the general scope of the officer’s duty and (2) 
was a justifiable use of power within that duty. But 
“the room for the police to trespass outside of their 
statutory authority is extremely limited. Specifically 
it must be restricted to situations where the police, 
in addition to acting  within the general scope of 
their authority, must have no other feasible less 
intrusive alternative and the manner of carrying  out 
the impugned activity must also be reasonable,” said 
Chief Justice MacDonald. He continued:
 
Here, it appeared to be the judge’s view, and I 
agree, that this case represents one such rare 
circumstance. Specifically, [the sergeant’s] action 
of opening the door further in order to protect 
the safety of all present that evening was 
authorized. Furthermore, this 
additional action was, as the 
judge found,  reasonable in the 
circumstances. After all and as 
noted the police were justified 
in their actions up to the time 
[ the accused] voluntar i ly 
opened his door. They were 
legitimately at his door late at 
night responding to a noise 
complaint. Furthermore, the 
situation was tense by that time 
with [the accused] having 
previously hurled profanities 
towards the authorities.  Then 
when [the accused] did open 
his door, [the sergeant] saw him 
hiding something black and 
shiny that he feared may have 
been a knife. In these circumstances, pushing 
the door would appear to be the only feasible 
alternative. Specifically, by that instant, it would 
have been too late for less intrusive measures 
such as retreating or issuing a noise violation 
ticket.  Thus by simply pushing the door further 
open, in my view, [the sergeant] acted 
reasonably in his effort to see what [the accused] 
may have been hiding.
 Nor can we seriously question the police action 
immediately following  [the sergeant's] “pushing” 
of the door.   After all, upon “pushing” the door 
further open, [the sergeant] immediately saw the 
gun pointed in his direction. ...
“[T]he room for the police to 
trespass outside of their 
statutory authority is extremely 
limited. Specifically it must be 
restricted to situations where 
the police, in addition to acting 
within the general scope of their 
authority, must have no other 
feasible less intrusive alternative 
and the manner of carrying out 
the impugned activity must also 
be reasonable.”
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Furthermore, the judge accepted that “it was 
only after [the sergeant] saw a firearm come up 
from behind the leg that he reacted by 
immediately entering the home of [the accused] 
for purposes of gaining control over the 
situation”.
 
So, despite the fact that [the accused] may not 
have intentionally pointed the gun at [the 
sergeant], no one can reasonably fault the officer 
for reacting as he did upon the gun being 
revealed. [paras. 32-35]
The appeal on the alleged s. 8  Charter breach was 
dismissed. Other grounds of appeal, however, were 
allowed and, as a result, the possession of a loaded 
restricted firearm without authorization conviction 
was set aside. The accused’s overall sentence was 
reduced to 18 days (time served), a two year 
probation term was imposed and his 10-year 
prohibition order was replaced with a five year ban. 
A Different View
Justice Beveridge disagreed with his colleagues. In 
his view the police conduct amounted to a serious 
Charter breach. “The issue is not whether [the 
sergeant] acted reasonably in pushing  open the 
door,” he said.  “The issue is did he have lawful 
authority to do so. That would only materialize if he 
had reasonable grounds to believe that his safety, or 
the safety of others, was at risk and his search in 
pushing  open the door was reasonably necessary in 
the circumstances. Absent a new-found power to 
enter a private dwelling  based on a suspicion that 
officer safety concerns are triggered, the conclusion 
is inescapable that the [accused’s] reasonable 
expectation of privacy protected by s. 8 of the 
Charter was infringed or denied.” Justice Beveridge 
would have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), 
quashed the convictions and entered acquittals on 
all charges.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PRETEXT STOP ARBITRARY:
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Turpin, 2012 SKCA 50                    
 
A member of a roving  traffic unit, 
who had his drug  sniffing  dog  with 
him, saw an older-model motor 
home on the TransCanada Highway 
weave from the center line over the 
fog  line about six times.  Although the motor home 
did not cross the center line and was not speeding, 
the officer was concerned the driver may have been 
drinking  and pulled it over.  A CPIC check indicated 
the vehicle had not been reported stolen. The 
accused produced his driver’s licence and 
registration as requested and the officer, at this point, 
was satisfied there was no basis for suspecting  the 
accused was impaired. However, the accused was 
unusually nervous and CPIC entries indicated he 
had convictions for a “take auto without consent” 
some 22 years earlier, and assault and assault police 
officer in 1988. 
 
A backup officer arrived and approached the motor 
home, apparently detecting  a strong  odour of 
Bounce fabric softener, coming  from its interior. This 
officer noted that the accused was unusually nervous 
and learned he had being  driving  for 12 hours, 
travelling  from Vancouver (a source of illegal drugs) 
to Thunder Bay (a destination for illegal drugs). He 
was going  to visit his sister for a couple of weeks 
and had about $2,000 in his wallet. The backup 
officer decided to pursue an investigation into the 
“true identity” of the motor home. According  to the 
officer, the dashboard VIN plate appeared relatively 
old but rivets securing  it were shiny and the area 
surrounding  it was clean.  In his experience and 
training, this could mean that the VIN number plate 
had been tampered with or changed. He compared 
the dashboard VIN number to a number on the 
federal safety certification label on the doorpost but 
they did not match. In reality, the officer had 
misread the label. 
The accused was arrested for possessing  stolen 
property and VIN tampering, advised of his right to 
counsel and given police warnings. He was placed 
in the back of a police car.  The motor home was 
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searched for evidence related to the stolen property 
investigation. Police said they were looking  for 
additional labels, paint colour changes or 
information that might confirm the true owner and 
identity of the vehicle. A drug  sniffing  dog  was also 
used and made a positive hit for drugs. Police 
discovered various compartments containing  45 
kilograms of cocaine worth between $1.1  million 
and $2.5 million and 262 pounds of marijuana 
worth between $470,000 and $733,000.  The 
accused was re-arrested and subsequently charged 
with possessing  cocaine and marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench (trial)
The judge concluded that the 
arresting  officer did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that the motor 
home was stolen when the accused 
was arrested.  In his view, the 
arresting  officer lacked the necessary 
subjective belief and was acting  on 
nothing  more that a hunch based on 
intuition. Most of the officer’s 
observations had nothing  to do with 
the fact the vehicle was stolen but 
related to what he believed were 
indicators of drug  possession. The 
judge found that the arrest for the 
purported reason that the motor 
home had been stolen was really a 
pretext to justify searching  the vehicle for drugs. The 
judge also considered the makeup of the specialized 
roving  traffic unit - all experienced members in 
contraband interception - as a background 
consideration in assessing  the credibility of the 
arresting  officer. In the end, the trial judge 
concluded there had been violations of both ss. 8 
(unreasonable search) and 9 (arbitrary detention) of 
the Charter. The drugs were excluded under s. 24(2) 
and the accused was acquitted.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittal, 
advancing  a number of arguments. These arguments 
included:
• the accused was lawfully arrested and the 
search of the motor home was incidental to 
that arrest;
• the accused was lawfully detained and the 
search of the motor home was incidental to 
the detention; and
• the accused was lawfully detained for highway 
traffic purposes and the police were entitled to 
use their highway traffic authority to search the 
motor home and check the VIN numbers.
     
Lawful arrest/search?
The trial judge’s decision that police did not have 
reasonable grounds to justify an arrest was upheld. 
“In order for an arrest to be lawful, two conditions 
mus t be me t ,” s a i d Ju s t i c e 
Richards. “First, the arresting  officer 
must bel ieve he or she has 
reasonable and probable grounds 
on which to base the arrest. Second, 
those grounds must be reasonable 
and p robab le when v iewed 
objectively.” In this case, the trial 
judge ruled that the officer did not 
subjectively have reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest and 
there was no reason to interfere 
with this assessment. Since the 
arrest was unlawful, any search 
incidental to it was also unlawful.
Lawful investigative detention/search?
 
The Crown submitted that, absent a lawful arrest, the 
accused was lawfully detained on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion that he was in possession of a 
stolen motor home.  “‘Reasonable suspicion’ ... 
represents a lower threshold than the standard of 
‘reasonable and probable grounds’ associated with 
the power of arrest,” said Justice Richards. Thus, the 
argument went, the accused could have been 
lawfully detained in circumstances which could not 
sustain a valid arrest. However, “as with the 
authority of the police to effect arrests, an officer 
purporting  to invoke the power to detain for 
investigatory purposes must subjectively believe he 
or she has the requisite basis for interfering  with an 
“In order for an arrest to be 
lawful, two conditions must 
be met. First, the arresting 
officer must believe he or 
she has reasonable and 
probable grounds on which 
to base the arrest. Second, 
those grounds must be 
reasonable and probable 
when viewed objectively.”
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individual’s liberty.” Again, the trial judge found the 
officer did not have a subjective reasonable 
suspicion that the motor home had been 
stolen.  Therefore, the stop was not a lawful 
investigative detention. 
The Crown alternatively submitted that, by the time 
the drug  dog  was deployed, the police had a 
reasonable suspicion there were drugs in the motor 
home and therefore could detain him for a sniffer 
dog  search. The problem with this, however, was 
that evidence revealing  a reasonable suspicion that 
the motor home was being  used to transport drugs 
was obtained after the accused’s arrest. “The Crown 
cannot apply information acquired by way of an 
unlawful search to retroactively validate the arrest 
which led to it,” said the Court of Appeal. “While 
there might have been a reasonable suspicion that 
the motor home contained drugs by the time the 
sniffer dog  was deployed, that suspicion was built on 
a platform of evidence obtained by way of the 
unlawful search of the motor home.” Thus, both the 
sniff search and any detention arising  to carry it out 
breached the Charter. 
Furthermore, “even if there was a valid investigative 
detention in relation to suspected drug  offences, it 
would not have carried an entitlement to conduct a 
full scale search of the motor home.” The search 
power incidental to an investigative detention is 
narrow and limited to a protective pat-down:
The search of the motor home which led to the 
discovery of the drugs in this case was far from a 
“protective pat-down.” It involved police officers 
lifting carpet, looking  under the dash and the 
hood of the vehicle and opening  cupboards and 
storage compartments. It was not undertaken out 
of concerns for safety and was thus in no way 
properly incidental to an investigative detention. 
[para. 95]
 
“The search of the motor home which led to the discovery of the drugs in this case was far 
from a ‘protective pat-down.’ It involved police officers lifting carpet, looking under the dash 
and the hood of the vehicle and opening cupboards and storage compartments. It was not 
undertaken out of concerns for safety and was thus in no way properly incidental to an 
investigative detention.”
SPECIALIZED UNITS
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal commented generally on the 
issue of using a “roving traffic unit” comprised of police officers 
experienced in recovering illegal drugs through traffic stops. Two 
of the police officers in this case were handlers of the only single 
profile drug sniffer dogs in Saskatchewan and several had 
attended the Pipeline Convoy Course, a program designed to 
enhance the skills of officers so as to make them better able to 
detect “travelling” criminals. Although the Crown suggested that 
the trial judge improperly saw something nefarious in the police 
decision to deploy a traffic unit composed of personnel with 
these sorts of backgrounds, Justice Richards did not see it that 
way:
In considering this concern, it is important to confirm at 
the outset that, in and of itself, there is nothing improper 
or untoward about the police deploying traffic officers 
or units with specialized training, equipment or 
expertise, including training, equipment or expertise 
relating to the detection of drug crimes. The law does 
not require police officers involved in traffic work to be 
blind to the possibility that motorists might be involved 
in a variety of illegal or criminal activities.  ...
 
However, this is not to say that the make-up of a traffic 
unit of the sort involved in this case must be wholly 
disregarded in a judge’s fact-finding in relation to the 
reason for a traffic stop or the bona fides of police 
actions. A trial judge attempting to ascertain whether an 
arrest was a pretext for conducting a drug search is 
surely entitled to consider, as one part of the full matrix 
of relevant facts, that the police officer who made the 
arrest was a member of a traffic unit comprising (among 
other things) the only two single profile drug dogs in the 
province. That is no more than common sense. 
 
The point to remember, however, is that the use of a 
specialized traffic unit is not itself objectionable. The 
Charter protects against arbitrary detentions and 
unreasonable searches. So long as these limits on their 
authority are respected, the Charter does not prevent 
the police from using specialized or specifically-trained 
traffic units.  Nor should it.  The public quite properly 
expects law enforcement personnel to use the most 
effective techniques possible when combating crime. 
[paras. 50-52]
 
Rather than finding the trial judge’s use of the roving traffic unit, 
in itself, improper, Justice Richards concluded the judge could 
take the make-up of the unit and the training of its members as 
merely one of the multiple background considerations in 
assessing the arresting officer’s credibility. 
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Lawful detention/search for highway traffic 
purposes?
The Court of Appeal also ruled that the accused was 
not validly detained in relation to highway traffic 
matters under Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act 
(TSA). Section 278 of the TSA only sets out a driver’s 
general obligation to provide  registration certificates 
and other information. Section 279(2) is concerned 
with vehicle safety and roadworthiness and applies 
when a driver or owner is ordered to submit a 
vehicle to examinations or tests.  However, no 
demand was ever made to the accused. “Moreover, 
at least from the time of his arrest and afterward, [the 
accused’s] detention on the roadside had nothing  to 
do with highway traffic issues,” said Justice Richards. 
“[The officer’s] own testimony indicated that he was 
concerned solely with criminal activity during  this 
time period.” Thus, his detention was not authorized 
under the TSA and any search powers which might 
have existed were not engaged. 
 
The trial judge’s s. 24(2) Charter analysis excluding 
the evidence was upheld and the Crown’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
      
FOUND-IN NOT ENOUGH FOR 
CONVICTION
R. v. Lai, 2012 BCCA 202
When police executed a search 
warrant the accused was found 
sleeping  in a house used as a 
marihuana grow operation. His motor 
vehicle was parked outside and a vial 
of pills with his name on it was on the kitchen 
counter.  There was no other evidence that he was 
involved in the marihuana production. The house 
and B.C. Hydro contract were registered to someone 
else.
British Columbia Provincial Court (trial)
The accused did not testify. However, his co-
accused, who was also found sleeping  in the home, 
said that they were at the house to pick up the 
accused’s motor vehicle. They stayed over at the 
house because they were tired of driving  from the 
city where they lived. The trial judge did not believe 
this story but did believe that they had recently 
arrived at the house prior to their arrest. The judge 
inferred both accuseds’ participation in the 
operation from being  found in a “bunker” - a 
dwelling  almost entirely dedicated to the growing  of 
marihuana.  In his view, only someone maintaining 
the operation would sleep in it. The judge found that 
the operation was automated and did not require 
full-time attendance to feed and water it, 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Impairment
“A conviction for impaired 
driving will rest where there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that 
an accused has driven while his or her ability 
to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by 
alcohol or a drug. To meet its burden of proof, 
the Crown may lead evidence of alcohol 
consumption and aberrant driving; but, given 
the nature of an impaired ability to drive, the 
standard may be met in the absence of 
evidence of aberrant driving through 
sufficient evidence of, among other things, a 
deterioration of the accused’s judgment or 
attention, a loss of motor co-ordination or 
control, increased reaction times, or 
diminished sensory perceptions, brought on 
by the voluntary consumption of alcohol or a 
drug.” - Saskatchewan Court of Appeal Justice 
Caldwell in R. v. Thomas, 2012 SKCA 30 at para. 13.
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presumably to deal with the fact that the accused 
were from out of town. They were convicted of 
producing marihuana. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused Lai successfully appealed his 
conviction. “The case against the [accused] comes 
down to his temporary presence in a house used to 
grow marihuana,” said Justice Donald for the Court 
of Appeal. “Maintenance of the operation is not the 
only inference; he could have slept over for a 
number of reasons. There is no circumstantial 
evidence that he did anything  to ‘produce’, 
including  ‘cultivating, propagating  or harvesting’, 
marihuana.” Just because the judge disbelieved the 
co-accused’s story did not enhance the prosecution’s 
case against the accused. The web of circumstances 
was not so compelling  that he had to provide an 
answer or stand condemned. The accused’s appeal 
was allowed and his conviction was set aside. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GUN ABANDONED:
s. 8 CHARTER NOT ENGAGED
R. v. Stevens, 2012 ONCA 307
A  confidential informant told police 
that the accused was a drug  dealer 
and kept a handgun and ammunition 
at his residence. The informant said 
he had been in the residence and 
saw the gun during  a certain time period. An 
Information To Obtain (ITO) was 
drafted and a telewarrant was 
obtained. Police executed a “stealth 
search” in the middle of the night. 
Moments before they entered, police 
outside the residence saw someone 
throw a white sock out the window 
with something  in it. The sock 
landed in an adjacent yard and was 
determined to contain a semi-
automatic firearm. The accused was 
the sole occupant of the residence 
and no other drugs or weapons were 
found inside.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
Although there were errors in the ITO, the judge 
declined to determine the validity of the warrant. 
Instead, she held that the gun was discarded into an 
area where the accused had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy and that he had abandoned it. 
There was no s. 8  Charter breach and the accused 
was convicted of unauthorized possession of a 
firearm, careless handling  of a firearm and failure to 
comply with a condition of his recognizance.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused unsuccessfully argued that the validity 
of the search warrant must be determined before 
deciding  whether the gun was properly abandoned. 
The Court of Appeal agreed, holding  that the firearm 
had been abandoned: 
In the factual circumstances here, the trial judge 
was not required to determine the legality of the 
search. In order to engage a person’s rights under 
s. 8 of the Charter, that person must first 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Having  thrown the handgun out the window 
into a neighbour’s yard, the [accused] no longer 
had any reasonable expectation of privacy 
respecting the gun. He no longer had possession 
or control over the gun; instead, he attempted to 
divest himself of possession or control of it.  
Indeed, he gave up the ability to regulate access 
to it when he threw it away.  Furthermore, he 
offered no evidence of any subjective 
expectation of privacy in it.  ...
Usually, it is only after the [accused] has 
established a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the court is considering 
whether the search was an unreasonable 
intrusion on that right to privacy that there 
is a need to consider the reasonableness 
of the search and whether there has been 
police misconduct. Here, as the trial 
judge had correctly held that the gun had 
been abandoned, s. 8  was not engaged, 
and the trial judge was not obliged to 
consider the validity of the telewarrant or 
the legality of the police search. 
“Having thrown the 
handgun out the 
window into a 
neighbour’s yard, the 
[accused] no longer 
had any reasonable 
expectation of 
privacy respecting 
the gun.”
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Having regard to this conclusion, it is 
unnecessary for us to address the balance of the 
arguments put forward by amicus as they all 
relate to the legality of the search (e.g. whether 
the trial judge erred in holding  there was no 
cognizable legal nexus between the execution of 
the warrant and the seizure of the firearm and 
whether the validity of the ITO and therefore the 
search warrant would have had a bearing  on the 
issues whether the police acted in good faith for 
the purpose of a s. 24(2) analysis). [references 
omitted, paras. 8-10]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS FOR 
SOIRA ORDER CAN BE IMPOSED 
TOGETHER
R. v. Burns, 2012 SKCA 52                     
 
The accused was convicted on four 
charges of sexual assault proceeded 
by indictment under the Criminal 
Code. Sexual assault is a “designated 
offence” under s. 490.011(a). 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court (trial)
The judge sentenced the accused to four concurrent 
terms of four years and eight months imprisonment, 
imposed a 10-year firearm prohibition and a DNA 
order. Although the accused had been convicted of 
more than one “designated offence”, the judge 
interpreted s. 490.013(2.1) as not applying  because 
the sentence was concomitantly pronounced for 
multiple designated offence convictions and the 
accused’s criminal record disclosed no prior 
convictions for a designated offence. The judge 
declined to order a lifelong  Sex Offender 
Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, instead 
imposing compliance for 20 years. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the sentencing  judge’s order 
arguing  he misinterpreted the application of multiple 
designated offence convictions to the circumstances 
of this case. When an offender is convicted of a 
designated offence, the sentencing  judge must order 
an offender to comply with SOIRA. A SOIRA order 
ends 20 years after it was made if the maximum term 
of imprisonment for the offence is 10 or 14 years but 
applies for life if the person is convicted of more 
than one applicable designated offence. “The 
meaning  of the section is plain: offenders who 
commit multiple designated offences will be subject 
to a lifetime SOIRA compliance order,” said Justice 
Caldwell. “Nothing  in the Criminal Code suggests 
the lifetime duration of the order rests on the 
offender being  sentenced separately for each 
offence. In our view the clarity of the section is such 
that there is no need to resort to other principles of 
statutory interpretation” 
The sentencing  judge’s narrow application of 
s.  490.013(2.1) was rejected and a more broad 
interpretation was adopted to include an offender 
committing  multiple designated offences regardless 
of whether the sentences for those offences were 
imposed separately or all together.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Impaired Driving v. Over 80mg%
“Impaired driving and driving “over 
8 0 ” a r e s e p a r a t e c r i m i n a l 
offences. Operating a motor vehicle 
with a BAC over the legal limit is not 
an essential element of impaired 
driving. Accordingly, it is logically and legally possible for 
a jury to acquit on an “over 80” charge and convict on an 
impaired driving charge.” - Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Best, 2012 ONCA 421 at para. 11, reference omitted. 
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“[O]ffenders who commit multiple designated 
offences will be subject to a lifetime SOIRA 
compliance order. Nothing in the Criminal 
Code suggests the lifetime duration of the 
order rests on the offender being sentenced 
separately for each offence.”
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NO DETENTION: POLICE ASKED 
ONLY PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
WHEN EXECUTING WARRANT
R. v. Boca, 2012 ONCA 367
Police identified an IP  address for a 
computer that was sharing  child 
pornography files. After determining 
the computer’s location (municipal 
address) they obtained a search 
warrant for the residence. Upon entering  its 
basement, police found three bedrooms 
that were separately rented out by the 
owner. The accused was seated on a 
couch in the common area. Another man 
emerged from his room while the third 
tenant was not at home. The police spoke 
to the two men and showed them the 
warrant. The accused identified his 
bedroom. Police determined that there 
was a computer in the common area and 
another in the accused’s bedroom. The 
other man was allowed to leave when the 
police learned he did not own or use a 
computer. 
A cursory examination of the accused’s computer 
was performed and it was found to contain child 
pornography. The accused was called into the room 
where the officer confronted him with the images 
and questioned him about them. He initially denied 
all knowledge of the images but subsequently 
admitted he was responsible for them. He was 
immediately arrested, read his right to counsel and 
cautioned. He indicated he understood and was 
transported to the police station. Two broken USB 
drives were found in his pocket on a search incident 
to arrest and he admitted they contained child 
pornography. He said he had broken them on the 
way over to the police station. Upon booking  he 
declined another opportunity to consult counsel. 
Later, he again was informed of his right to counsel 
and given the opportunity to exercise it but declined. 
He subsequently described, in a 37-minute recorded 
interview, how he accessed and made child 
pornography available using  a Limewire program on 
his computer. 
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The accused submitted that his s. 10(b) Charter right 
to counsel had been violated and sought to have his 
various inculpatory statements excluded from 
evidence under s. 24(2). He claimed he was first 
detained when police spoke to him and showed him 
the warrant. The trial judge found that at the time of 
the first statement (identifying  his bedroom) the 
accused was not detained and therefore no s. 10(b) 
breach occurred. However, the judge concluded that 
the accused was detained at the 
time of the second statement 
(when he was called into the room 
and confronted about the images) 
and therefore that statement was 
obtained from a s. 10(b) violation. 
As for the third statement (recorded 
at the police station), there was no 
violation. The judge refused to 
exclude any of the statements 
under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
convic ted on 10 counts o f 
distributing  child pornography and 
11 counts of possession of child 
pornography.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused continued to argue that his s. 10(b) 
right to counsel was breached and that the trial 
judge erred in admitting  all three statements he gave 
to police. But the Court of Appeal disagreed. The 
Court stated:
In our opinion the trial judge did not err in 
admitting the first and third statements.  In 
relation to the first statement, in the context of 
execut ing a search war rant fo r ch i ld 
pornography at a residence occupied by 
numerous tenants, the police were entitled to 
ask some preliminary questions to determine 
how to proceed. The [accused’s] identification of 
his room arose during  this preliminary stage. He 
was neither physically detained nor subjected to 
any coercive demand or direction.  As a result 
the [accused’s] right to counsel under s. 10(b) 
was not infringed.
“[I]n the context of 
executing a search 
warrant for child 
pornography at a 
residence occupied by 
numerous tenants, the 
police were entitled to 
ask some preliminary 
questions to determine 
how to proceed.”
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The trial judge found that the third statement was 
not tainted by the breach of the [accused’s] s. 
10(b) right to counsel in relation to the second 
statement. We agree. Prior to the third statement, 
the [accused’s] right to counsel was addressed 
on several different occasions. The [accused] 
chose not to contact counsel. The [accused] 
understood his rights and did not want to 
exercise them. The third statement was given in a 
different location, several hours after the alleged 
breach of the [accused’s] right to counsel in 
relation to the second statement, and the 
[accused] does not submit that the statement 
was involuntary. The fact that the [accused] had 
already made several incriminating admissions 
in his second statement, standing  alone, is not a 
basis from which to infer that the third statement 
is tainted. [paras. 13-14]
Even if the second statement was inadmissible the 
third statement was not tainted and the accused was 
properly convicted. His appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SAME CASE: 
GUNS IN, DRUGS OUT
R. v. Campbell, 2012 ONCA 394
After receiving  an anonymous 
Crime Stoppers tip that the accused 
was dealing  drugs and had firearms 
at his apartment, police could only 
corroborate information relating  to 
his background. His drug  dealing  or weapons 
possession could not be verified. A warrant to search 
his apartment was obtained and police entered at 
night, weapons drawn and without warning. They 
tossed two distraction devices inside during  the 
process.  Firearms, ammunition, illegal drugs, a 
gravity knife, and cash were seized and the accused 
was charged with 21 firearm and drug-related 
offences. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice (trial)
The Crown conceded that the Information to Obtain 
(ITO) the search warrant fell short of the reasonable 
grounds standard to believe that evidence of drugs 
and firearms would be found in the accused’s home. 
The judge found a number of acts of serious police 
misconduct but that they resulted from carelessness, 
not recklessness or a wilful disregard for the 
accused’s Charter rights. Although the officers 
showed bad judgment, they did not act in bad faith. 
The judge excluded the evidence of the non-firearm 
related offences under s. 24(2) but admitted the 
evidence related to the firearm offences. He said:  
The public interest in gun offences distinguishes 
the gun-related evidence from the rest. The 
public is sufficiently concerned with gun related 
offences to permit the conclusion that admitting 
the evidence of those offences will not in the 
long term bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The public interest in the drug and 
other offences suggested by the seized evidence 
is not so acute that it permits the conclusion 
that, despite the seriousness of the state 
infringing  conduct and its impact on [the 
accused’s] Charter rights, exclusion of the 
evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into greater disrepute than its admission. 
[para. 84, [2009] O.J. No. 4132 (Ont.S.C.J.)]
The accused was convicted of 10 firearm related 
charges including  possession of a loaded restricted 
firearm, careless storage of a restricted weapon, 
possession of a prohibited weapon and possession of 
a loaded prohibited weapon.  
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that the trial judge 
misapplied the s. 24(2) legal analysis to the facts of 
the case. First, he alleged the judge erred in finding 
that the police officers did not act in bad faith. 
Second, he argued the judge overemphasized the 
seriousness of the firearm offences. The Court of 
Appeal, however, did not accept either submission.
The trial judge did not approach his analysis in a 
piecemeal fashion. Instead, he carefully considered 
the relevant factors and conducted his analysis 
based on the totality of the evidence. “It was open to 
the application judge to find that despite the 
seriousness of the state misconduct, the officers did 
not act in bad faith,” said the Court of Appeal. “He 
was alive to all of the factors that properly weighed 
in this analysis. The seriousness of Charter-infringing 
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state conduct can be seen to fall on a spectrum from 
blameless conduct, through negligent conduct to 
conduct demonstrating  a blatant disregard for 
Charter rights. From his reasons, it is clear that the 
trial judge did not consider the breaches to fall at the 
serious end of the spectrum. On the facts found by 
him, to the extent the police actions fall short of 
good faith, they do not fall far short.”
The Court also rejected the contention that the trial 
judge overemphasized the seriousness of the 
firearm-related offences.  The trial judge expressly 
acknowledged the seriousness of both the firearm 
and drug  offences. Rather than overemphasizing  the 
seriousness of firearm offences when referring  to 
their “certain character”, he was speaking  to the 
heightened public interest in their prosecution.  He 
noted the increasing  incidents of gun crime in 
Canada and the need for society to be protected 
from criminals armed with deadly handguns.  Thus, 
society had an even greater interest in the 
adjudication of the firearm offences than the drug 
offences.  The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
IN (admissible) OUT (excluded)
Glock 9 mm semi-automatic
North American Arms Inc. 22 calibre 
revolver
Glock high-capacity magazine with 17 
rounds of ammunition
241 rounds of ammunition
gravity knife 
C$9,538 
US$1,580
48.76 grams of crack cocaine
485.19 grams of marihuana
2.77 grams of hash oil
Source: [2009] O.J. No. 4132 (Ont.S.C.J.)
x
x
x
x
x
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
CAN PROVE PRESUMPTION OF 
IDENTITY APPLIES
R. v. O'Meara, 2012 ONCA 420
A police officer conducting  RIDE 
stops spoke with the accused and 
smelled alcohol coming  his breath. 
The accused said he had been 
drinking  the previous evening.  An 
ASD demand was given and the accused registered a 
fail. He was arrested for “over 80”, given an 
approved instrument demand and transported to the 
police station where he consulted with duty counsel. 
He was taken to the breath room where 
a qualified breath technician concluded 
that the instrument was functioning 
properly. Two breath samples - 181 mg
% and 188 mg% - were obtained.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The judge was satisfied that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest and breath 
demand because the accused failed the ASD. 
Although the breath technician did not specifically 
testify that the breath samples had been analyzed by 
the approved instrument, the judge found as much, 
based on the evidence of an approved, duly tested 
instrument capable of conducting  the required 
analysis being  used. The accused was convicted of 
operating  a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol 
concentration exceeding 80 mg%. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that the Crown failed to meet 
the statutory preconditions for relying  on the results 
of the breath samples under s. 258(1)(c)(iv) of the 
Criminal Code. While there was evidence that a 
“RIDE” 
Reduced 
Impaired 
Driving 
Everywhere
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breath sample was received from the accused 
directly into an approved instrument, he suggested 
that there was no evidence that an analysis of the 
sample had been made by means of the instrument 
since the breath technician did not testify that the 
instrument analyzed the samples. In his view, this 
precondition could not be proven by circumstantial 
evidence. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted 
that explicit testimony by the breath technician that 
the instrument “analyzed” the sample was not 
required because there was evidence that the 
process occurred and that the instrument provided a 
result. 
The appeal judge found the trial judge erred in 
concluding  that there was circumstantial evidence 
the approved instrument had analyzed the samples. 
Therefore, the presumption under s. 258(1)(c) was 
not available. “There was virtually no evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the samples 
were, in fact, analyzed as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iv) 
by the instrument,” she said. The accused’s appeal 
was allowed and an acquittal was entered. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the appeal judge erred in law 
by finding  that the statutory presumption found in s. 
258(1)(c) was not available on the evidence. Justice 
Brown, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, described the s. 258(1)(c) 
presumption this way:
Section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code creates what is commonly 
referred to as a “presumption of 
identity”.  This presumption, if 
applicable, relieves the Crown of 
the burden of proving  that the 
accused’s blood alcohol level at 
the time of the offence was the 
same as it was at the time of 
testing.  Where this presumption 
is not available, the accused’s 
blood alcohol level at the time of 
the offence is normally proven 
by evidence from a toxicologist.
I n o r d e r t o r e l y o n t h e 
presumption, the Crown must 
meet the statutory preconditions 
specified in s. 258(1)(c)(ii)-(iv) of the Criminal 
Code.  The samples must be taken as soon as 
practicable, the first sample must be taken 
within two hours of driving, and there must be at 
least a 15 minute interval between samples (s. 
258(1)(c)(ii)); the samples must be received from 
the accused directly into an approved container 
or into an approved instrument operated by a 
qualified technician (s. 258(1)(c)(iii)); and “an 
analysis of each sample [must be] made by 
means of an approved instrument operated by a 
qualified technician” (s. 258(1)(c)(iv)). [paras. 
27-28]
Circumstantial evidence can establish the s. 258(1)
(c)(ii)-(iv) conditions the Court of Appeal ruled:  
... In the instant case the trial judge relied on 
circumstantial evidence to infer that the samples 
were analyzed by an approved instrument and 
found that the presumption was applicable. This 
inference was available.  The qualified breath 
technician testified that the breath samples were 
taken by an approved instrument (i.e. an 
Intoxilyzer 8000C); the approved instrument was 
in proper working order (as determined by a 
number of diagnostic tests); the [accused] 
provided two suitable samples of his breath 
directly into the instrument; and the instrument 
produced results of 188 mg and 181 mg of 
alcohol in 100 ml of blood. The breath 
technician’s evidence on these points was not 
challenged at trial. 
... In this case there was evidence that 
the breathalyser used was an 
approved instrument and that results 
were properly obtained. None of this 
evidence was contested by the 
[accused].  In my view, there was 
ample circumstantial evidence from 
which the trial judge could properly 
conclude, as she did, that the 
[accused’s] breath samples went 
through an analysis by means of an 
approved instrument.   Admittedly, the 
breath technician did not specifically 
testify that the breathalyser instrument 
in question analyzed the accused 
breath samples.  However, that is a 
reasonable inference the trial judge 
could draw from the fact that the 
approved instrument provided results 
“Section 258(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code creates 
what is commonly referred 
to as a ‘presumption of 
identity’. This 
presumption, if 
applicable, relieves the 
Crown of the burden of 
proving that the 
accused’s blood alcohol 
level at the time of the 
offence was the same as it 
was at the time of 
testing.”
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of the breath samples. [paras. 33-34]
The appeal judge erred in law in finding  that the 
presumption in s. 258(1)(c) was not available in the 
circumstances of this case. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and the accused’s conviction was restored.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SERIOUS BREACH 
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTING 
CHARTER INTEREST RESULTS IN 
EXCLUSION OF BREATH TEST
R. v. Berger, 2012 ABCA 189
 
After the accused failed an ASD test 
at the roadside, he was arrested, 
advised of his right to contact a 
lawyer and given a breath demand. 
He indicated that he wanted to 
contact a lawyer and was taken to the police station, 
given the telephone number for Legal Aid and 
placed in a phone room. He made various 
telephone calls for several minutes. After observing 
the accused hang  up the phone, the officer entered 
the room. He told the officer the Legal Aid line was 
busy and asked him what to do. The officer said 
“Keep trying” and observed that the accused was 
visibly frustrated. The accused tried for a few more 
minutes and again spoke to the officer about not 
being  able to get legal advice. The officer told him 
that he had two options; (1) continue attempts to 
contact legal advice or (2) choose to provide a 
sample of breath. The officer did not tell him that he 
could “hold off” giving  a breath sample until he had 
spoken to a lawyer. The officer then read a waiver, 
stating  that the police could not take a statement or 
ask for participation in any process that provides 
evidence until the accused was certain whether he 
wanted to exercise his right to contact a lawyer. The 
accused replied that he did not want to waive his 
right to contact a lawyer but said “it’s impossible to 
get that right”. The accused was presented to the 
breathalyzer and provided a sample of his breath. 
He was returned to the phone room and, after six 
minutes, successfully obtained legal advice. He later 
gave a second breath sample. Both samples 
exceeded the legal limit.
Alberta Provincial Court (trial)
The Crown conceded that the accused’s s. 10(b) 
Charter right had been violated. His actions did not 
amount to an unequivocal waiver of s. 10(b) so there 
had been a breach of its informational component. 
The judge, however, concluded that the breach was 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Consent - Sexual Assault
“The Criminal Code explicitly 
provides that there can be no 
consent if the complainant is 
incapable of consenting to 
the activity (s. 273.1). Capacity to consent to 
sexual activity requires something more 
than the capacity to execute baseline 
physical functions. The question is the 
degree to which intoxication negates 
comprehension or volition. A drunk 
complainant may retain the capacity to 
consent. Mere drunkenness is not the 
equivalent of incapacity. Nor is alcohol-
induced imprudent decision making, 
memory loss, loss of inhibition or self 
control. A drunken consent is still a valid 
consent. Where the line is crossed into 
incapacity may be difficult to determine at 
times. Expert evidence may assist and even 
be necessary, in some cases, though it is not 
required as a matter of law.” - Alberta Court 
of Appeal in R. v. Haraldson, 2012 ABCA 147 at 
para. 7, references omitted. 
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merely technical and at the low end of the scale. He 
found the arresting  officer was acting  in good faith 
throughout:
• the officer informed the accused of his rights 
and how to use the phone;
• the officer provided access to available 
telephone numbers;
• there was no evidence the accused felt 
pressured or coerced to hurry along; and 
• the officer was forthright honest and fair  to both 
sides when answering questions on the stand.
The judge found the Crown had discharged its 
burden of showing  that the accused had been given 
a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and that 
society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits of 
the case favoured admission of the certificate of 
analysis under s. 24(2). The breathalyzer results were 
admitted and the accused was convicted of over 80 
mg%. 
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge concluded the trial judge was 
correct and dismissed the accused’s appeal.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused again appealed the trial judge’s 
decision arguing  the certificate of analysis should 
have been excluded as evidence because of the 
admitted Charter breach. 
Contrary to the trial judge’s characterization of a 
technical breach, the Court of Appeal found the 
violation much more serious. The trial judge 
misunderstood the nature of the conceded Charter 
breach. He had described it as a breach of the 
informational component of s. 10(b) rather than its 
true character, a breach of the implementational 
component. The police took a breath sample in the 
face of an express refusal to waive the right to 
counsel. There was no explanation for the breach 
and the officer had other options by which to obtain 
the evidence without a Charter violation occurring. 
He could have waited and readily achieved his 
objective without a Charter breach:
Indeed, at the time the first breath sample was 
given there was no need to act quickly to 
preserve evidence. Only 34 minutes had elapsed 
between the time he was first observed by the 
officer and the time the waiver was read to him. 
There was still plenty of time to obtain breath 
samples within the prescribed two-hour time 
limit in s. 258 of the Criminal Code; even the 
passage of that time would not excuse taking 
breath samples without giving a diligent accused 
the right to first consult counsel. It would have 
been easy to avoid the problem by simply 
allowing the [accused] more time, on a busy 
evening, to contact a lawyer before presenting 
him to the breathalyzer. The breach is put in 
further context by the knowledge that the 
[accused] was in fact able to contact counsel 
after a further 6 minutes when returned to the 
telephone room on his request, a request which 
further emphasized his unwillingness to waive 
that right. [para. 18]
Furthermore, the law of waiver was clear and there 
was no evidence the officer was unfamiliar with it. 
“The officer simply grasped an opportunity to gather 
incriminatory evidence rather than allow the 
[accused] additional time to attempt to gain legal 
advice,” said the Court of Appeal. “A forthcoming 
attitude on the stand, short of providing  this 
evidence, and providing  the [accused] with timely 
access to a telephone, cannot support a finding  of 
good faith in the absence of this critical 
explanation.” 
The impact on the accused’s Charter protected 
interests was also significant. “The evidence would 
not have been harvested but for the Charter breach, 
and that it was essential to substantiate the charge,” 
said the Court of Appeal. This was so even though 
“This case illustrates that Charter breaches can arise other than in the context of  dramatic 
circumstances or crimes yielding penitentiary consequences, yet yield the same result, here 
the exclusion of evidence leading to acquittal.”
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the accused’s choices in complying  with the demand 
were limited:
While any lawyer contacted by the [accused] 
would have told him that his options were 
limited with regards to non-participation in the 
face of a breathalyzer demand, that does not 
excuse a Charter violation. The lawyer could 
have provided other critical advice, including 
the importance of remaining silent, strategies for 
interrogation and practical advice about 
securing release from custody.
 
More importantly, to accept the argument that 
the Charter breach would not have mattered 
because both refusing to blow, and achieving  a 
fail rating after blowing  result in a criminal 
consequence, would be to insulate s. 10(b) 
Charter breaches in the course of an 
investigation of an over .08 charge from any 
consequence because the accused person has 
little choice but to eventually provide a breath 
sample in any event. That is not the law. [paras. 
24-25]
Although the truth seeking  function of the s. 24(2) 
analysis favoured admission, the seriousness of the 
breach and the significant undermining  of the 
accused’s right to counsel warranted exclusion of the 
evidence:
The apparently innocuous nature of the Charter 
breach which occurred in this case evidences 
the importance of diligence in protecting Charter 
rights. While the arresting officer appeared to 
take steps to ensure protection of the [accused’s] 
right to counsel, upon closer examination he 
ignored that right, in the face of an express 
refusal to waive it, to take advantage of an 
evidence-gathering  opportunity. This case 
illustrates that Charter breaches can arise other 
than in the context of  dramatic circumstances or 
crimes yielding penitentiary consequences, yet 
yield the same result, here the exclusion of 
evidence leading to acquittal. [para. 27]
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed and his 
conviction was quashed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Uttering Threats
“The actus reus is the uttering 
of the threat to cause serious 
bodily harm, and the mens rea 
is the utterance with the 
intention the words will intimidate or be 
taken seriously. In considering the actus reus, 
it is necessary to determine whether the 
words are indeed a threat prohibited by the 
Criminal Code. This ... engages analysis of the 
words used by the accused. In seeking to 
discern whether the words expressed a threat, 
the objective standard ... is applied – would a 
reasonable person consider that the words 
uttered were a threat? ... [para. 33]
If the expression of a prohibited threat is 
established, the trier of fact must consider the 
mens rea – did the accused utter the words as 
a threat? Otherwise stated, did he ... intend to 
intimidate or have the words taken seriously? 
As in other situations where there is no direct 
evidence of intention, intent is a matter to be 
inferred from the evidence. In this task the 
trier of fact gains some assistance from 
considering, objectively, the meaning a 
reasonable person would take from the 
words.” [para. 35] - British Columbia Court of 
Appeal Justice Saunders in R. v. Armstrong, 2012 
BCCA 248, references omitted. 
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The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide 
an opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers.
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank and 
this conference will provide delegates from the police 
community with an opportunity to engage in a variety of 
leadership areas. The Police Leadership Conference will 
bring together experts who will provide current, lively, and 
interesting topics on leadership. The carefully chosen list of 
keynote speakers will provide a first class opportunity at a 
first class venue to hear some of the world's outstanding 
authorities on leadership, the challenges facing the policing 
community and how to overcome those challenges.
The Service of Policing:               
Meeting Public Expectation
April 7 - 9, 2013
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Rick Mercer chronicles, satirizes and ultimately celebrates all that is great and irreverent about this 
country. Known as "Canada's Unofficial Opposition," Mercer is our most popular comic, a political 
satirist who knows exactly what matters to regular Canadians and what makes them laugh. Born in 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Mercer has won over 25 Gemini Awards.                                          
Assembly of First Nations National Chief Shawn A-in-chut Atleo is a Hereditary Chief from the 
Ahousaht First Nation. In July 2009, Atleo was elected to a three-year mandate as National Chief to 
the Assembly of First Nations. Atleo has been a tireless advocate for First Nations by spending time 
in First Nations in every region of the country.
Craig Kielburger co-founded, with his brother Marc, Free The Children in 1995 at only 12 years of 
age. Today, he remains a passionate full-time volunteer for the organization, now an international 
charity and renowned educational partner that empowers youth to achieve their fullest potential as 
agents of change.
Wendy Mesley is a regular contributor to CBC News: The National, CBC Television’s flagship news 
program, appearing throughout the week in a regular segment that asks provocative questions about 
the news stories Canadians are talking about. She also contributes to CBC News: Marketplace, CBC 
Television's award-winning prime-time investigative consumer show. 
Richard Rosenthal was appointed BC’s first Chief Civilian Director of the Independent Investigations 
Office on January 9, 2012. He has extensive experience in civilian oversight of law enforcement 
having served for 15 years as deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, where he worked on 
various assignments.
Ian McPherson is a Partner, Advisory Services with KPMG in Toronto and the former Assistant 
Commissioner of Territorial Policing at the Metropolitan Police Service in London, UK. Ian is with 
KPMG's Global Centre of Excellence for Justice and Security, leading its work throughout North 
America.
Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie is considered the most experienced peacekeeper on the 
planet. MacKenzie has commanded troops from dozens of countries in some of the world's most 
dangerous places. In Sarajevo, during the Bosnian Civil War, he famously managed to open the 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Dr. John Izzo has devoted his life and career to helping leaders create workplaces that bring out the 
best in people, plus discover more purpose and fulfillment in life and work. For over 20 years, he has 
pioneered employee engagement, helping organizations create great corporate cultures and leading 
brands through transformations that create both customer and employee loyalty.
In an increasingly social world, Susan Cain shifts our focus to help us reconsider the role of introverts 
- outlining their many strengths and vital contributions. Like A Whole New Mind and Stumbling on 
Happiness, Cain's book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts In a World That Can't Stop Talking, is a 
paradigm-changing lodestar that shows how dramatically our culture has come to misunderstand and 
undervalue introverts. 
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UNLOADED FIREARM WITH 
AMMUNITION NOT INCLUDED 
IN POSSESSING LOADED ONE
R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 432
After receiving  information from an 
anonymous source that the accused 
s tored drugs he deal t a t his 
residence, police set up surveillance 
and subsequently obtained a CDSA 
search warrant. The warrant was executed and 
police found drugs, cash, scales and packaging 
materials. A sawed-off .22 calibre rifle and 
ammunition were also found inside a tennis racquet 
case in the accused’s bedroom. The ammunition was 
in this case but not loaded in the rifle. The accused 
was charged with several offences including 
possession of a loaded firearm.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The trial judge held that s. 95 of the Criminal Code 
created two modes of committing  the same offence. 
He found that a person who possesses a loaded 
firearm necessarily possesses an unloaded firearm 
with usable ammunition at hand. Possessing  an 
unloaded firearm together with usable ammunition, 
was therefore included in the offence of possessing  a 
loaded firearm. The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to three years in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that possessing  an unloaded 
prohibited or restricted firearm together with readily 
accessible ammunition was not an included offence 
in possessing  a loaded prohibited or restricted 
firearm. In his view, the elements of both offences 
are not the same and the second part of s. 95(1) was 
not an included offence but rather a separate one. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that a 
person possesses a prohibited firearm that is loaded 
with ammunition also possesses a firearm “together 
with readily accessible ammunition”. It suggested 
that s. 95(1) described two ways of committing  one 
offence. It is an offence to possess a loaded 
prohibited firearm or an unloaded prohibited firearm 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 95 Criminal Code
Possession of prohibited or restricted 
firearm with ammunition
(1)  Subject to subsection (3), every 
person commits an offence who, in 
any place, possesses a loaded 
prohibited firearm or restricted 
firearm, or an unloaded prohibited 
firearm or restricted firearm 
together with readily accessible 
ammunition that is capable of being discharged in 
the firearm, without being the holder of
(a)  an authorization or a licence under which the 
person may possess the firearm in that place; and
(b) the registration certificate for the firearm.
Punishment
(2)  Every person who commits an offence under 
subsection (1)
(a)  is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and 
to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a 
term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii)  in the case of a second or subsequent offence, 
five years; or
(b)  is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding one year.
Exception
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who is 
using  the firearm under the direct and immediate 
supervision of another person who is lawfully 
entitled to possess it and is using the firearm in a 
manner in which that other person may lawfully use 
it.
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with readily accessible ammunition. Both modes of 
committing  the offence are found within the same 
subsection of the Criminal Code with the latter mode 
being an included offence in the first.  
Justice Weiler, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, agreed with the accused and rejected the 
Crown’s position. In this case, the information 
particularized the offence as possession of a “loaded 
prohibited firearm” contrary to s. 95(2). The 
evidence showed that the firearm was not loaded 
but that the ammunition was found alongside it in 
the same tennis racquet case. Rather than s. 95(1) 
creating  one offence with two modes of 
commission, it created two offences:
1. possession of a loaded firearm; and 
2. possession of an unloaded firearm with readily 
accessible ammunition. 
The Meaning of “Loaded”
The second offence described in s. 95(1) requires 
that the firearm be unloaded, in addition to being 
“together with readily accessible ammunition.” The 
Court of Appeal said this:
The term “unloaded” has a distinct meaning: it is 
the opposite of the term “loaded” in the first 
part. Although the term “loaded” is not defined 
i n s . 9 5 o r a n y w h e r e e l s e i n t h e 
Code, regulations to the Firearms Act, ... contain 
a definition of the term “unloaded” which reads:
“unloaded”, in respect of a firearm, means that 
any propellant, projectile or cartridge that can 
be discharged  from the firearm is not contained 
in  the breach or firing chamber of the firearm 
nor in the cartridge magazine attached to or 
inserted into the firearm.
By virtue of the federal Interpretation Act, ... s. 
15(2)(b), “where an enactment contains an 
interpretation section or provision, it shall be 
read and construed  as being applicable to all 
other enactments relating to the same subject-
matter unless a contrary intention appears.” The 
Interpretation Act defines the term enactment as 
“an Act [of Parliament] or regulation or any 
portion of an Act or regulation”. Therefore, the 
regulations to the Firearms Act are enactments 
and the definition of “unloaded” contained in 
those regulations applies to s. 95(1) of the 
Criminal Code. Both enactments, though 
concerned with different aspects, deal with the 
same subject matter – gun control. Further, there 
is nothing in the Code to suggest that this 
definition is inappropriate or contraindicated. 
Indeed, the definition accords with the ordinary 
meaning one would ascribe to the word 
“unloaded”, and by extension, “loaded” when 
used to refer to a firearm. [paras. 49-40]
Included Offences
“An offence is ‘included’ if its elements are 
embraced in the offence charged,” said Justice 
Weiler. “In other words, all of the essential elements 
of the offence must be part of the offence charged.” 
He continued:
[I]t will not always be true that a person who 
possesses a loaded firearm has necessarily 
possessed an unloaded firearm together with 
usable ammunition. For example, a person, X, 
unlawfully possessing a loaded gun will not 
necessarily be the same person who possessed 
the unloaded gun with readily accessible 
ammunition. Another person, Y, may have been 
in possession of the gun, lawful or otherwise, 
with readily accessible ammunition, and loaded 
the gun. X may come along and steal Y’s loaded 
gun. Y may give X the gun in loaded condition. Y 
may even lose the loaded gun and X may find it. 
In each of these circumstances, the person guilty 
of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm does 
not necessarily commit the offence of possession 
of an unloaded firearm with readily accessible 
ammunition.  
Thus, the offence of possessing  an unloaded firearm 
with readily accessible ammunition is not an 
included offence of possessing  a loaded firearm. The 
accused’s appeal on this charge was allowed and the 
conviction was set aside the loaded firearm charge. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
www.10-8.ca
Volume 12 Issue 3 - May/June 2012
PAGE 34
VALID YOUTH WAIVER 
REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING OF 
CHARGES
R. v. W.C.K., 2012 ABCA 185
 
The accused, a 16-year-old youth, 
was arrested for break and enter and 
breach of probation occurring  earlier 
that morning. He was Chartered and 
cautioned and indicated he wanted 
to call a lawyer. While he was in the telephone 
room, the police obtained further information 
implicating  him in the dangerous driving  of stolen 
vehicles the previous evening. The police did not 
inquire into whether the accused had successfully 
contacted counsel (he had not), obtained legal 
advice or contacted his parents or other suitable 
adult. Nor did they inform him of the new, more 
serious charges that were being  investigated. The 
accused agreed to the interview process but he had 
not been advised that he was going  to be charged 
with dangerous driving  and possession of stolen 
property. Using  a form developed to accomplish the 
objectives of s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 
an officer took the young  offender through the form, 
which was videotaped. He was then told he was 
being  charged with possession of stolen property 
and dangerous driving. The accused subsequently 
provided an inculpatory statement. 
Alberta Provincial Court (trial)
 
The judge found that s. 146 had not been complied 
with before the accused gave his inculpatory 
statement. In the judge’s view, police failed to 
provide s. 10 Charter rights with respect to the more 
serious offences before he gave a statement. Thus the 
waiver was invalid. The statement was excluded and 
the accused was acquitted of dangerous driving  and 
possession of stolen property. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown suggested that the trial judge confused a 
valid s. 146 waiver with a breach of the Charter and 
the Court of Appeal agreed. The trial judge should 
have first determined whether s. 146 had been 
BY THE BOOK:
Youth Criminal Justice Act: s. 146
146. (1) Subject to this section, the law relating to the 
admissibility of statements made by persons accused of 
committing offences applies in respect of young 
persons.
Marginal note: When statements are admissible
(2) No oral or written statement made by a young person who is 
less than eighteen years old, to a peace officer or to any other 
person who is, in law, a person in authority, on the arrest or 
detention of the young person or in circumstances where the peace 
officer or other person has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
young person has committed an offence is admissible against the 
young person unless
 (a) the statement was voluntary;
  (b) the person to whom the statement was made has, before the 
statement was made, clearly explained to the young person, in 
language appropriate to his or her age and understanding, that
 (i) the young person is under no obligation to make a statement,
  (ii) any statement made by the young person may be used as 
evidence in proceedings against him or her,
 (iii) the young person has the right to consult counsel and a parent 
or other person in accordance with paragraph (c), and
  (iv) any statement made by the young person is required to be 
made in the presence of counsel and any other person consulted in 
accordance with paragraph (c), if any, unless the young person 
desires otherwise;
  (c) the young person has, before the statement was made, been 
given a reasonable opportunity to consult
 (i) with counsel, and
 (ii) with a parent or, in the absence of a parent, an adult relative or, 
in the absence of a parent and an adult relative, any other 
appropriate adult chosen by the young person, as long as that 
person is not a co-accused, or under investigation, in respect of the 
same offence; and
(d) if the young person consults a person in accordance with 
paragraph (c), the young person has been given a reasonable 
opportunity to make the statement in the presence of that person. 
Marginal note: Exception in certain cases for oral statements
(3) The requirements set out in paragraphs (2)(b) to (d) do not apply 
in respect of oral statements if they are made spontaneously by the 
young person to a peace officer or other person in authority before 
that person has had a reasonable opportunity to comply with those 
requirements.
Marginal note: Waiver of right to consult
(4) A young person may waive the rights under paragraph (2)(c) or 
(d) but any such waiver
 (a) must be recorded on video tape or audio tape; or
 (b) must be in writing and contain a statement signed by the young 
person that he or she has been informed of the right being waived.
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satisfied. Then, if it had been, determine whether 
there was a s. 10 Charter breach attracting  a s. 24 
remedy. “The two analyses are related and have 
many commonalities, but they are not the same,” 
said the Court of Appeal. It continued:
The Crown must establish a valid waiver beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Where compliance with the 
informational component is established beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the trial judge is expected to 
infer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
that the young person understood those rights. 
The test for informational compliance is 
objective. The establishment of a Charter 
violation rests with the person asserting the 
breach. Whether there was a breach, and its 
seriousness if so found, are critical findings in 
determining  whether any remedy ought to be 
granted, and, if so, what that remedy ought to 
be. While they may ultimately result in the same 
conclusion, they ought not be conflated or 
confused. [references omitted, para. 11]
 
And further:
 
Obtaining statements from a young accused 
engages three different levels of legal protection: 
(1) the common law voluntary confessions rule, 
(2) the constitutional right to silence and the 
right to counsel under section 10 (a) and (b) of 
the Charter, and (3) the specific provisions of the 
YCJA. The Supreme Court of Canada and 
appellate courts across Canada have repeatedly 
held that the purpose of these layers of 
protection is to provide enhanced procedural 
and evidentiary safeguards to young persons 
accused of a criminal offence. [references 
omitted, para. 13] 
The validity of a s. 146 waiver can be divided into 
three fact driven inquiries, each of which must be 
established by the Crown beyond a reasonable 
doubt:
1. Was the waiver voluntary?
2. Did the police adequately explain to the young 
person the right to consult counsel and a parent 
and to have any person consulted present 
during the giving of the statement?
3. Did the young  person appreciate the 
consequences of waiving those rights?
 
A waiver under s. 146 requires that a youth 
understand the charges against them because, 
without that information, they cannot give a fully 
informed waiver. In this case, the accused was taken 
through a very important part of the waiver process 
without knowing  the charges against him, which 
tainted the entire process. So, although the trial 
judge’s analysis was flawed, the result was 
reasonable and the Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE B&E 
WOULD BE EGREGIOUS 
ABDICATION OF POLICE DUTY
R. v. Grégoire, 2012 QCCA 846
Police received an anonymous 911 
call at 1:23 am reporting  a break and 
enter at a home. The caller also said 
that there were marijuana plants at 
the address given. The operator 
contacted the detachment responsible for the area 
and but there was no such address. Later it was 
learned that there was a matching  address in a 
nearby town. Police officers, unaware “plants” were 
mentioned when the 911 call was made, attended 
the premises at about 8:52 am and immediately 
noticed there was a broken window, scattered 
broken glass from the side of the garage, a screen 
window that had been removed and a black sheet of 
“Obtaining statements from a young accused engages three different levels of legal 
protection: (1) the common law voluntary confessions rule, (2) the constitutional right to 
silence and the right to counsel under section 10 (a) and (b) of the Charter, and (3) the 
specific provisions of the YCJA.”
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paper covering  a window. An officer displaced the 
paper with a slight move of his hand and discovered 
a marijuana grow operation inside. He immediately 
withdrew from the area and a search warrant was 
subsequently obtained and executed. The accused 
rented the premises.
Court of Quebec (trial)
The judge found that the officer did not enter the 
premises once he observed the presence of 
marijuana plants from the exterior and therefore no 
s. 8 Charter breach occurred.  The accused’s motion 
to exclude the evidence was dismissed and he was 
convicted of producing marihuana. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the displacement of the 
black sheet of paper over the window at the 
premises, which allowed the police to see the 
marijuana, constituted a warrantless search. It was 
presumptively unreasonable and violated s. 8  of the 
Charter regardless of the subsequent issuance of the 
warrant. The Crown agreed the search was 
warrantless but suggested it was justified. 
In support of his position, the accused advanced 
several submissions:
• There was no emergency since over seven 
hours elapsed between the time of the 911 call 
and police attendance at his house. 
• The warrantless search could not be justified on 
any other basis, such as incidental to arrest, 
invitation to knock, “plain view” or “plain 
smell”. By moving  the black sheet of paper, the 
police officer was carrying  out an investigative 
measure, as opposed to observing  or sensing 
something that required no investigation.
• Anyone could place a 911 call and report 
whatever they wanted. Therefore, the police 
must exercise caution about information they 
receive in such circumstances, especially from 
an anonymous caller. The mere fact that police 
have an obligation to investigate the 
commission of alleged crimes and to ensure the 
security of persons and property does not mean 
that they can ignore the rights and freedoms 
that they are to safeguard pursuant to their 
mandate.
• Since it should have been apparent upon arrival 
that a break and enter was no longer in 
progress and no perpetrators were to be 
apprehended, police powers were limited to 
knocking  on the door to speak to the occupant. 
On the assumption there would have been no 
reply, they would have been duty bound to 
simply leave the premises without any further 
investigation of a break and enter or for any 
other purpose.
• Moving  the black sheet of paper constituted a 
serious violation of s. 8 and a further perimeter 
search of the premises that followed was 
demonstrative of more violations. 
• Since the evidence of the presence of 
marihuana was obtained illegally, the 
subsequently issued search warrant was invalid 
and the evidence gathered as a result ought to 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).
In determining  whether the police acted within their 
common law powers when they interfered with the 
accused’s liberty or property, the Quebec Court of 
Appeal considered the two questions developed 
from the English Waterfield case: 
1. Did the conduct fall within the general scope of 
any duty imposed by statute or recognized at 
common law; and 
2. Did the conduct, albeit within the general 
scope of such a duty, involve an unjustifiable 
use of powers associated with the duty.
In this case, Justice Hilton, delivering  the unanimous 
judgment, concluded that the police officers were 
acting  within the general scope of their statutory 
duties under s. 48 of Quebec’s Police Act when they 
responded to a report of a break and enter and 
examined the exterior of the premises, even seven 
hours after it was reported. Even though there was 
no emergency when the police officers arrived at the 
exterior of his residence, their conduct was still 
lawful. “Flexibility must be given to them in the 
exercise of their duties and the reality of the 
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situations in which they find themselves,” said 
Justice Hilton. “In my opinion, this case illustrates 
what constitutes allowable police discretion. ... The 
fact that there was no emergency given the lapse of 
time does not diminish their obligation to ensure 
security on the premises.” He further stated:
The unusual situation of investigating  a break 
and enter several hours after its commission that 
is immediately apparent from a broken window 
upon arrival on the premises, necessitates the 
exercise of police discretion. The failure of 
police officers to investigate a break and enter 
by conducting  a perimeter investigation, simply 
because they did not arrive at the scene in a 
timely fashion, would be an egregious 
abdication of their general police mandate to 
ensure the safety of property. [para. 34]
The Court of Appeal found the police action was 
lawful:
Here, a window had been broken, and without 
knowledge of who put the black sheet of paper 
on it or why, it was reasonable for [the officer] to 
displace it to determine the cause and manner of 
the window having been broken. The window 
frame in which a window had been broken is 
certainly an area of the premises in which the 
officers could reasonably expect to find 
evidence of the break and enter. Further, the 
subsequent walk around the building to verify 
whether any doors had been broken into is 
reasonable in light of the report of a break and 
enter.
... ... ...
In my view, the police conduct in issue should 
be seen as a justifiable use of police power. Their 
duty to ensure the safety of property and 
investigate reports of crime is essential to the 
public good. The interference, as such, was 
minimal, and did not involve [the officers] 
entering  the residence, but rather simply 
displacing a sheet of paper on a window and 
walking  around perimeter of the residence to 
ascertain whether any doors may have been 
broken into. The broken window was 
immediately apparent to [the officer] upon 
exiting his vehicle, confirming  to him that he 
was conducting  an investigation of a break and 
enter, according to the evidence at hand and 
adapting it to the circumstances. [paras. 41,43]
The trial judge correctly found that the police action 
was justified under the circumstances. There were no 
Charter breaches and there was no need to resort to 
s. 24(2). However, even if s. 24(2) applied, the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The failure of police officers to investigate a break and enter by conducting a perimeter 
investigation, simply because they did not arrive at the scene in a timely fashion, would be an 
egregious abdication of their general police mandate to ensure the safety of property.”
BY THE BOOK:
s. 48 of Quebec’s Police Act: The Mission
The mission of police forces and of 
each police force member is to 
maintain peace, order and public 
security, to prevent and repress 
crime and, according  to their 
respective jurisdiction as set out in 
sections 50 and 69, offences under the law and 
municipal by-laws, and to apprehend offenders.
In pursuing  their mission, police forces and 
police force members shall ensure the safety of 
persons and property, safeguard rights and 
freedoms, respect and remain attentive to the 
needs of victims, and cooperate with the 
community in a manner consistent with cultural 
pluralism. Police forces shall target an adequate 
representation, among their members, of the 
communities they serve.
Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
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